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Ray Christensen*
Introduction and Theoretical Framework
The revision of an election system is one of
the touchiest issues in a western-style democracy.
Every politician knows that a proposed reapportionment scheme might
affect his chances for
reelection.
Thus, many accuse politicians of not
considering the merits of a revision proposal, but
only the personal consequences. This phenomenon
is seen at regular 10-year intervals in the United
States.
With each new census, some states are
required to redraw their congressional district
boundaries, and, invariably, some of the disputes
that ensue have to be settled by the courts or a
nonpartisan panel. This kind of action is by no
means limited to state governments.
In many
foreign countries which have a democratic form of
government, attempts to revise the election 3ystem
have sparked fierce debates.
One of the most
recent of these debates, concerning a 1982 revision
of the Public Offices Election Law in Japan, will be
the subject of this research.
A theory by Maurice Duverger will be used to
explain politicians' behavior regarding this bill.
He says:
The notion that politics is both a conflict
between individuals and groups for the
acquisition of power, which the victors
use to their advantage at the expense of

*Ray is a senior majoring in International
Relations and in Japanese.
He will be attending
Harvard Law School this fall.
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the vanquished and an attempt to establish a social order beneficial to all
constitutes the b::r.sis of our theory of
political sociology.
He continues:
The primary objective of parties is to
acquire power or a §>hare in the exercise
of power; they seek to win seats at
elections, to name deputies and ministers, 2 and to take control of government.
As Duverger suggests, people often think
that politicians are motivated solely by a desire for
power.
It will be shown that the positions
Japanese politicians took regarding the 1982 revision bill were determined by whether or not the
politician and his party would benefit from the
proposed changes.
Duverger's ideas have been expressed and
examined in other situations by many other
political scientists.
Lorimer says that because
election boundaries help determine who gets
elected, discussions about redrawing boundarie~
become an item of utmost concern to politicians.
In Lightbody's analysis of revision in the municipal
election system of Winnipeg, Canada in the 1920s,
he describes the proposal worked out between the
conservative Citizens' League and the opposition
Labor party as a compromise where each party
lobbied for t,pe adoption of proposals that would
benefit them.
More recently, Choi claims that the adoption
of multi-member districts in South Korean elections
was merely an attempt by the government party to
give their urban candidates a chance to be elected.
Under the former system of single-member
districts, the government party often came in
second to the opposition party. However, with
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two candidates being chosen from each district ,
the government party now holds 5 roughly half of
the urban seats in the legislature.
Another example of this phenomenon can be
seen in the initial adoption of proportional representation (PR) in Switzerland, an appropriate
example because the change debated in Japan in
1982 was whether or not to adopt a PR system of
election in the National Constituency of the House
of Councillors.
In the Swiss canton of Techino,
an unfair election system allowed the conservative
party to get 75 percent of the seats in the legislature with only 50 percent of the vote. The opposition Freedom party, who also got 50 percent of
the vote, demanded adoption of a PR system where
50 percent of the vote would translate into 50
percent of the seats.
The conservative party
refused to negotiate on their demands.
After a
rebellion in which the opposition took all government leaders hostage and took control of government buildings, the conservatives gave in and set
up a PR system of election. Clearly, the conservatives were unwilling to change an obviously
unfair system that benefited them un til riots
demonstrated that continued intransigence would be
more harmful to their ffelf-interest than the adoption of the PR system.
To see how Duverger's theory, as illustrated
in these case studies, works in the context of
Japanese politics, it is first necessary to understand cultural differences that affect decisionmaking in Japan. Japanese society places a much
greater value on the preservation of group harmony and consensus than do traditional western
democracies.
Nakane finds this emphasis on
consensus throughout Japanese society, begin~ing
with decisions made in the local village council.
Ward contrasts the U. S. system based on
open competition in which the majority wins with
the Japanese system where a simple majority is

4

PI SIGMA ALPHA REVIEW

not sufficient; a consensus is achieved where
"face" and harmony (Le., no open contention) are
preserved at all costs. He further explains that
even with the adoption of western democratic institu tions, traditional Japanese decision -making has
only been masked.
Compromises are worked out
beforehaIgd and the Diet unanimously approves the
decision.
Existing System Needed Change
Japan's basic election system was set up in
1947 as a part of the new postwar constitution.
However, that system was modeled after the prewar system that first came into being as a part of
~he Meiji Constitution promulgated in 1890.
Both
constitutions gave Japan a bicameral legislature.
The Lower House was called the House of Representatives, currently consisting of 511 members
whose term of office is four years or less if the
Prime Minister calls for an election or is toppled
by a no-confidence vote.
The members of the
Lower House are each elected from medium-sized
local districts (three to five elected from each
district) . By contrast, the Upper House or House
of Councillors is a 252-member body where each
councillor is elected for six years with half of the
members up for election every third year.
The
members of the Upper House come from two types
of constituencies. One hundred of the 252 members are elected at large (National Constituency),
and the remaining 152 members are elected in local
two- to eight-member districts--similar to the
Lower House election districts.
There are three aspects of this election
system that are important when considering election revision.
First is the National Constituency
of the Upper House which was meant to be "a
council of cool geason to exercise restraint on the
Lower House."
The framers of Japan's postwar
constitution thought that the National Constituency
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would attO'act talented people who were above party
politics.
Second, the postwar politicians also
placed very stringent restrictions on campaign
expenditures, the length of the campaign period
and what types of election activities would be
permitted. Third, they assigned to each district
the number of representatives proportional to that
district's population, but they failed to include any
provision
for
revising
their
distribution
in
response to population shifts.
These three specifics of the 1950 Public
Offices Election Law were the roots of problems
that have sincd developed in the Japanese electoral
system.
First, the National Constituency has
attracted so-called "talent" candidates
(movie
stars, TV personalit~es and famous athletes) as
opposed to the high quality elites that the law was
meant to attract.
These "talent" candidates are
elected because they have enough popularity
nationwide to garner the votes sufficient for
election. Though the political parties would rather
have party regulars in those seats, they make use
of the political reality by recruiiipg these "talent"
candidates to run on their slate.
The second problem inherent in this sYbtem is
that even though campaign spending is severely
limited, campaign costs have skyrocketed. Oikawa
estimates that in National Constituency elections, a
candidate can be expected to spend two million
dollars, and in the general election of 1974, called
the "plutocratic election," thf2 majority party spent
a total of 120 million dollars.
Though campaign expenditure laws are on the
books, they are, as a matter of course, ignored
by almost all candidates. Why this is done can be
understood by looking at the National Constituency
races.
A candidate is allowed to spend approximately 110,000 dollars (27 million yen), but this
limit would be exceeded if he only P,!S up the
100,000 posters allowed by the same law.

6
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The third problem is that population has
shifted, causing a serious imbalance in the apportionment of seats across the nation. An example
of this shift is the election of Nishimura Shoji to
an Upper House seat from rural Tottori prefecture.
In Nishimura's sparsely populated district, he was
elected with only 163,450 votes; however, in other
more populous districts 41 candidates failed to be
elected, even though they had more votes than
Nishimura. The extreme case was a candidate from
metropolitan Osaka who received 6321~22 votes and
came in fourth in a three-man race.
This problem of malapportionment is not as bad as in Great
Britain where the ratio of difference between the
largest and the smallest districts is 10 to 1 or in
the U. S. where the ratio between lfe largest and
smallest Senate districts is 62 to 1.
Although the malapportionment ratio among
the election districts in Japan is less than that in
the U. S. Senate districts, malapportionment is a
problem because, unlike the U. S. Senate, the
seats in Japan are supposed to be evenly
distributed.
The opposition parties continually
bring up this issue, and the Supreme Court (as
recently as April 27, 1983) continues to rule that
the districts should be reapportioned.
However,
the court also rules that reapportionment is a
legislative flftter and not in their area of
jurisdiction.
This ruling has produced the
curious phenomenon in which all parties agree that
reapportionment is necessary but no action is
taken because the two largest parties would lose
seats in any reapportionmeni 7 scheme that would
rectify the current imbalance.
With a knowledge of the major problems in the
Japanese electoral system, it becomes necessary to
understand the situation of each political party in
order to see how each party's position affected
that party's stand on election revision proposals.
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Currently there are five major parties in
Japan.
Two are national parties which receive
most of their support from rural areas, and the
other three are largely phenomena of the metropolitan areas. The largest party is the conservative Liberal Democratic party (LDP), which has
ruled :dfpan under one name or another since
WW II.
In the 1983 elections, the LDP's share of
the vote varied fl~m 60 to 70 percent in 10 largely
rural prefectures
to 20 percent in Tokyo, Osaka
and ~8kohama, the three largest metropolitan
areas.
The LDP maintains its parliamentary
majority by sweeping most of the rural districts.
However, they also have considerable voting
strength in metropolitan and semiurban areas,
which makes the LDP a national party.
The second largest party, with about half the
votes the LDP receives, is the Japan Socialist
party (JSP), the only other national party.
In
the same 1983 election, the JSP's share of the vote
was similar to the Ii1P's in that the JSP did best
in rural prefectures
and did worst in Tokyo and
Osaka.
As mentioned earlier, one can see why these
two parties would oppose any reapportionment plan
that would dilute the unrealistic electoral streng·th
of the rural prefectures. Both the LDP and the
JSP g'ain much of their support from these areas
as opposed to the other political parties which are
based in the metropolitan areas.
The other parties are the Democratic Socialist
party (DSP), Japan Communist party (JCP) and
Komeito. These three parties take a combined vote
of 35 to 45 percent; however, because of the
election system and malapportionment, they only
recei~2
about 25 percent of the seats in the
Diet.
In addition to these five parties, there
are other minor parties, such as the New Liberal
Club (NLC), which are trying to gain status as
major parties.

8
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Electoral Revision Attempts
That Have Failed

Just as it is necessary to understand the
pre-revIsIOn electoral system and situation in
Japan, so also is it necessary to see what other
election revisions have been attempted and why
they were not passed.
Although proposals to revise some part of the
election system are discussed in nearly every Diet
session, the first major postwar revision attempt
was made by Prime Minister Hatoyama (LDP) in
1956. His proposal was basically to change Japan
from multi-member electoral districts to singlemember districts as have the United States and
Great Britain. Hrebenar estimates that under such
a system the LDP wo~ have taken 89 percent of
the seats in the Diet.
It appears that Hatoyama
was using the guise of election revision to further
strengthen the LDP. Although the LDP had ample
votes to pass such a revision (t11z¥ had 63 percent
of the seats in the Diet in 1956),
they tabled the
measure in the face of a united opposition which
threatened 2So block passage of other important
legislation.
This decision is a good example of the Japanese desire for consensus. Because the opposition
parties refused to negotiate on any revision that
would weaken their position in the Diet, the LDP
preserved consensus by tabling its proposition. If
the LDP had insisted on passing the bill, the
opposition would most likely have boycotted Diet
sessions and resorted to various parliamentary
measures to slow down legislation.
In such a
situation the LDP would have been painted as
dictators and would probably have lost much of
their support among the Japanese people. Above
all else, harmony must be maintained.
This same revision proposal showed up with
slight variations throughout the 1960s and 1970s.
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The most significant variation was the inclusion of
a PR system of election in the proposal put forth
by Prime lVlinister Kakuei Tanaka.
Though a PR
system had been proposed in the 1966 and 1976
LDP Election Research Council reports, Tanaka was
the first to include it in a formal revision proposal.
Tanaka suggested the following:
first,
change all districts to one-member districts (same
as the Hatoyama plan); second, implement a PR
system to elect some of the Lower House members;
third, change the National Constituency of the
Upper House to a PR method of election.
The significance of this proposal was that a
few concessions were made to the opposition parties. The inclusion of a PR system of election in
part of the Upper and Lower House elections meant
that if Komeito took 10 percent of the vote, they
would get 10 percent of the seats in the PR constituencies.
However, the change to singlemember districts for the other seats would virtually wipe out opposition representation in those
seats.
The strategy behind this new proposal is easy
to see. Thayer says the LDP included PR only as
a means
attract opposition party support for the
proposal.
The LDP politicians were not dumb;
they knew that even though they conceded some
advantage by including a PR system, they would
still improve their overall position.
Hrebenar
estimates that under the Tanaka proposal the LDP
would have 2~ained 78.9 percent of the Lower
House seats.
In addition to gaining Lower House
seats, the LDP would improve its position in the
Upper House by changing the National Constituency to a PR system.
Why the LDP thought it
necessary to revise the National Constituency can
be seen in Hrebenal"s statement that the National
Constituency was one of the few part~80f the
election system that did not help the LDP.

tz£
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The reaction to such a thinly disg'uised
partisan proposal is easy to imagine. The opposition called the plan a "Kakumander," a play on
words combinin~9gerrymander with Tanaka's first
name (Kakuei).
Since the plan would only
weaken their positions, 3tfe opposition parties
obstructed Diet operations
which forced Tanaka
to abandon his proposal. Stockwin calls Tanaka's
abandonment of h:m. proposal "an unusual and
stunning reversal."
He calls it this because the
LDP, with its parliamentary majority, can usually
negotiate and gain the necessary consensus for
passage of its proposals. But since this revision
threatened the life of many of the other parties,
there was no room for negotiation. Clearly, each
Diet member based his decision on Tanaka's proposal on whether or not it would help his party or
himself.
Even within the LDP there was opposition to
Tanaka's proposal. Many established Diet members
had built up extensive support organizations in
their districts, and the prospect of their election
districts being cut up into smaller districts meant
that a candidate would be cut off from many
former areas of support. As the newspaper Asahi
Shimbun commented, the stand a Diet member
would take on this proposal could be easily determined
looking at conditions in his electoral
district.

b.f2

Both reVISIon attempts failed because in a
system that puts so much priority on consensus,
the opposition would never accept the heavyhanded attempts by the LDP to improve its own
position.
The LDP could have forced the bill
through with parliamentary majority. Such action,
however, would have hurt the LDP's public image.
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Successful Revision Attempts
In contrast to the proposals that failed, there
are three election reVISIOns that were passed
during this same period.
By looking briefly at
these three revisions, one can see that in order to
secure the necessary consensus for passage, a bill
must clearly benefit the parties from which support
is needed.
Twice the LDP has skirted the reapportionment issue by increasing the size of the Diet and
adding seats to urban constituencies (1976 and
1967). These two bills were successful for three
reasons. First, there was no attempt to decrease
rural seats. Such an attempt would have been met
with immediate opposition from the LDP and JSP
who rely on rural support. Second, the metropolitan-based opposition parties supported this measure because it gave them a chance to elect more
Diet members. Third, the LDP also benefited.
How was this revision beneficial to the LDP?
Since the law requires that Lower House districts
have from three to five seats and most urban
districts already had four or five seats, the addition of one or two new seats resulted in the splitting of ~ch district into two new three-member
districts.
Also, since the LDP takes 20 percent
of the vote in metropolitan areas, the LDP almost
always takes one seat in each metropolitan district.
One seat in a four-member district is only 25 percent of the seats, but one seat in each of two new
three-member districts adds up to 33 percent of
the seats. At the same time the opposition parties
increase their strength with four in place of three
possible seats.
It is clear that the LDP drew up a proposal
that appealed to its selfish interests as well as
those of the opposition, and by so doing consensus
was achieved and the bills were passed.

12
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The third example of a bill passed with the
necessary consensus is the 1975 revision of the
Public Offices Election Law. This revision of laws
governing campaign financing activities came on
the heels of the 1974 "plutocratic election." The
election was called this because of the high level
of spending that occurred.
Public opinion demanded that something be done, so the LDP, with
the cooperation of the DSP and JSP, drew up a
law that Hrebenar describes as accomplishing
nothing "except to legitimize the traditional sources
of funds and give the incorrect impressio~Jhat the
entire process had been
reformed."
One
interesting point of the bill was that it prohibited
the distribution of party literature at train stations
and department stores. Hrebenar sees this as an
LDP-JSP alliance to restrict the campaign activities
of the JCP and Komeito, both of which are based
on large volunteer organizations (the Communist
party and a lay Buddhist organization respectively); on the other hand, the LDP and JSP do not
have similar organizations to rely on. As could be
predicted from Duverger's theory, the only major
parties that opposed the 1975 revision were the
JCP and Komeito.
By
comparing
these
successful
reVISIon
attempts it can be seen that certain qualities are
necessary for an election revision bill to become
law in Japan. First, the supporters of a bill must
have more than just a simple majority; a certain
level of consensus is needed before a bill can be
passed.
Nakane, in her discussion of village
decision-making, draws the bottom line at 70 percent. She says that when 70 percent of a group
agrees, the other 30 percent will give in to preserve harmony, though th3K may maintain their
opposition to the proposal.
This behavior can·
be found in the passage of the 1975 revision bill
where the LDP-DSP-JSP coalition provided enough
consensus to override the JCP-Komeito opposition.
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Second, in order to gain that consensus, the
bill must appeal to the selfish interests of each
party whose support is needed.
Partial concessions which hurt the opposition parties' 0verall
standing will not attract those parties' support.
Revision of the Public Office
Election Law
With the lessons of Japanese election history
in mind, it becomes easier to understand the behavior of politicians with regard to the 1982 revision
of the Public Offices Election Law. The revision,
which was introduced into the Diet in May 1981,
consisted of the
following basic provisions:
(1) The 100
National Constituency councillors
would be elected nationwide as before, but instead
of voting for individual candidates, the voters
would vote for a party name. If the LDP received
40 percent of the vote in this new PR system,
then 40 percent of the 50 seats would be awarded
to the LDP. The LDP would award these 20 seats
to the top 20 candidates on their list of candidates
submitted at registration time. (2) In order for a
party to enter into the PR election, it must have
met at least one of three criteria. The party must
(one) have five current Diet members, (two) have
polled over 4 percent of the vote in the last Diet
election, or (three) have a total of at least 10
candidates registered in either the PR 01" local
districts of the Upper House election.
(3) The
registration deposit must be doubled to 16,000
dollars (4 million yen) for a candidate in the PR
election. This fee would be forfeited if the candidate loses and returned if he wins.
This new law would help all the major parties
by allowing them to cut down on campaign expenditures.
Instead of 30 candidates having to run
30 nationwide campaigns, the 30 candidates could
now concentrate on one nationwide campaign to
push the party name. On the other hand, minor

14
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parties and independents who ran only one candidate in the past would now be forced to put up
10 candidates at a cost of 160.000 dollars. Even if
the top candidate got elected. the party would still
forfeit 144.000 dollars.
Thus. un til the party
could get 4 percent of the vote or elect five
members to the Diet. the party would have to pay
144.000 dollars plus the costs of nationwide campaign each election year.
Clearly. the 1982 revision financially benefits the major parties and
appears to prohibit small parties and independents
from entering the election.
In addition to concern over finances. parties
are concerned with how the bill would affect their
strength in the Upper House.
Hrebenar claims
that the old National Constituency system puts the
LDP "at a serious disadvantage." since they "captured only 35.2 percent of these [National ConstituencY~6 seats despite gaining 44.3 percent of the
vote."
However. more recent elections (1977 and
1980) have shown the LDP doing much better in
the National Constituency. The chart below illustrates the percentage point difference between the
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percent of seats a party won and the percent of
votes a party received in each election.
By
considering only the change in the seat distribution system that a PR system would bring, it is
obvious that the JCP, DSP and Komeito would lose,
the LDP would gain, and the JSP could gain or
lose seats. A PR system would virtually eliminate
these differences between the percent of vote
received and the percent of seats received.
The introduction of a PR system would also
have another side benefit for the LDP.
In past
elections, the opposition parties had often united
and backed one candidate in districts where there
was only one seat up for election. However, with
the new PR system, each party would try to run
candidates "in as many districts ~s it could in
hopes of raising the percentage of votes the party
receives. The Japan Times notes that in the 1983
election each party was increasing the number of
candidates in the local constituency races.
Because each voter casts two ballots (one in his local
constituency and one in the National Constituency) , the parties were hoping that if a person
voted for a party's candidate in a local district,
then he would tend to vo § for the same party in
the National Constituency.
The end result would
be that cooperation among the opposition parties
would vi tu
disappear, and the LDP would face
a more splintered opposition in the local districts.

S

With a knowledge of the advantages and
disadvantages of the bill for each party, it is now
possible to look at its actual passage. The revision bill was introduced in May 1981 to the 94th
Ordinary session of the Diet, shelved during" that
session, reintroduced in October 1981 in the 95th
Extraordinary session, and finally carried over
into the 96th Ordinary session. Since Prime
Minister Suzuki had made a promise to secure
passage of the revision bill in the 96th Ordinary
session, he extended the session which was to

16
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end iIJ9May 1982 until August 21, a maximum of 94
days.
By July the bill was still backed up in committee, so in order to meet the August 21 deadline, the LDP, using their numerical majority,
rammed the bill out of committee. The Asahi
Shimbun says that the last bill passed through an
Upper House committee without a consensus vote
was the previous year's budget bill.
The newspaper continues that the last bill forced through
the entire Upper House by the4lfDP was the Alcohol and Tobacco Bill in 1975.
Once again the
LDP, unable to gain a consensus, was forced to
take such drastic measures (by Japanese standards) in order to secure passage of the revision
bill.
It is strange that the JSP, which would
benefit from the bill, withheld support.
This
would seem to conflict with Duverger's theory, but
actually the JSP supported the bill through its
inaction.

After the LDP forced the bill out of committee, all the opposition parties with the exception of
the JSP issued strong statements condemning the
LDP action.
But a JSP official conducted an
interview in which he said that his party resented
the fact that the LDP did everything by themselves, and thus it would be hard to call the
committee decision valid. This was a fluch milder
reaction than that of the other parties.
When the bill was up before the full body of
the Upper House, the LDP made a minor concession. Masatoshi Tokunaga, the LDP leader in the
Upper House, promised to review the proposed PR
system after two electi,fps and make any necessary
changes at that time.
With this minor concession, the JSP said they would attend the Upper
House session when the bill would be passed if one
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other party besides the LDP and JSP would also
agree to attend.
Again it is necessary to remember the Japanese desire for consensus decisions.
If all the
parties except the LDP were to have boycotted the
Diet session, then the LDP would have withdrawn
the revision bill in the face of public opposition to
the LDP's tactics. The JSP requirement that one
other party be present was a ploy by the JSP to
keep their agreement to attend the se4'3'ion from
being viewed as collusion with the LDP.
Nevertheless, the Japan Times4Fd Asahi Shim bun called
the bill an LDP-JSP bill.
It would have been politically infeasible for
the JSP to have done otherwise.
To have come
out in open support of the bill would have caused
the JSP to lose their position of leadership among
the opposition parties; yet to have opposed the bill
with boycotts, etc., would have killed the bill.
The JSP took the middle road of protesting the bill
but also attending Diet sessions.
In addition, it
got the conservative DSP to also attend, which
helped the JSP's position.

When the bill passed the Upper House, only
the LDP voted for it.
The JSP and DSP voted
against it, and the JCP, Komeito, most min~5
parties, and independents boycotted the session.
Though it could be argued that the LDP was
passing the bill without a consensus, the actual
situation was that the JSP and DSP were showing
their tacit support of the bill by their attendance.
The bill passed the Lower House and became
law on AugJf&t 18 with all major political parties in
attendance.
The LDP voted for the bill with
only the support of a minor party (NLC), and the
JSP, JCP, DSP and Komeito all voted against the
bill.
Once again this vote can be viewed as a
break in consensus, but the behavior of the
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parties shows that a consensus did exist.
The
lack of obstructive action on the part of the JSP
and DSP signalled to the other parties that the
JSP and DSP actually did support the bill despite
their public statements to the contrary.
In conclusion, it can be seen that for an
election proposal to be successful, a consensus
must be achieved by appealing to the selfish
interests of those parties involved. The 1982
revision bill clearly helped the LDP and JSP in
financial and electoral concerns.
The DSP, JSP
and Komeito all benefited financially but lost some
of the advantages the old National Constituency
system gave them. The DSP weighed the advantages and disadvantages and opted for tacit support. The JCP, Komeito and the independents all
viewed the bill as detrimental to their interests
and at first tried to obstruct passage by boycotting the Upper House. However, when the LDPJSP-DSP coalition became evident by the JSP-DSP
decision to attend Diet sessions, the JCP, Komeito
and the independents all gave in to the consensus
and attended the Lower House deliberations. Each
party followed its own self-interest, and because
the bill contained benefits for enough of the
parties, a consensus, albeit a tacit consensus, was
reached.
Of interest in this study is whether or not
the predicted benefits of the revision actually
occurred.
Most political analysts predicted the
following:
(1) the LDP would do better in both
the local districts and National (PR) Constituency;
(2) the number of invalid ballots would go down;
(3) the number of "talent" candidates would decrease; (4) election expenditures in the National
(PR) Constituency would go down; and (5) the
independents and minor parties would be shut out
of the National (PR) Constituency.
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The actual results were quite surprlsmg. As
expected, the LDP did better in the local districts.
The LDP polled 43.2 percent of 41he vote and
picked up four additional seats.
This good
showing by the LDP may be attributed to the
change in the electoral system or to an increase in
LDP support or to both.
In the National (PR) Constituency, the LDP
had its worst showing in postwar election history.
The party only polled 35.33 percent of the vote,
lower 48 than the previous low of 35.8 percent in
1977.
Nevertheless, the PR method of seat
allocation seems to have helped the LDP somewhat,
as can be seen on the following graph.
LDP PERFORMANCE IN NATIONAL
CONSTITUENCY ELECTIONS
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Election analysts blame the poor showing of
the LDP on a number of factors. First, in· April,
city, town and prefectural elections were held,
which traditionally hurt the LDP. Second, many
voters supported one of the many mini-partie~9that
sprang up in the National (PR) Constituency.
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It was also forecast that the number of invalid votes would increase.
Mainichi Shimbun says
this increase was one of the 55>iggest worries in
adopting the new PR system.
However, when
the votes were counted, the new election system
set a record for 5tpe lowest number of invalid
ballots since WW II.

The third prediction was that the number of
"talent" candidates would go down. Actually the
number of "talent" candidates increased f§2'm eight
to 13 when compared to the 1980 election.
The fourth prediction was that the cost of
campaigning would go down for most candidates.
Indeed, this was touted as the major reason for
implementing the PR system in the National Constituency. Mainichi Shimbun conducted a survey
of the finances of the National (PR) Constituency
candidates during the election. Fifty-one percent
of those responding replied that the election
campaign wasn't costing them anything, 40 percent
said that it was costing less than before, 6 percent said that it was costing about the same, and
3 perce~ said that it was costing more than
before.
The fifth prediction was that minor parties
and independents would be shut out from the
election process because of the strict entrance
requirements for all parties. The opposite occurred.
Various interest groups and independents
formed their own mini-parties, some of which were
successful.
There were a total of 18 political
parties which met the requirements to enter the
National Constituency election. In addition to the
regular major and minor parties, new parties
sprang up such as the Salaryman's party--Japan's
version of the tax revolt, the Welfare party-campaigning for the rights of the handicapped, the
Plebian party--headed by a self-proclaimed "gay
boy" advocating sexual liberation, and the Liberal
Party to Expel Kakuei Tanaka from Political Cir-
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54

cles.
In the election, the Salaryman's party
picked up two seats and the Welfare party picked
up one seat.
Two other previously established
minor parties also won one seat each.
However, it is impossible to see the long
range effects of the new PR system by looking at
only one election. B rynildsen says, "a search for
a normal Japanese election is likely to be as
unrewarding as a se~h for Utopia, Eldorado, or
the perfect Martini."
Nevertheless, the trends
seen in this election show that some predictions
were right and some were wrong. The LDP appears to have benefited from the new system, and
almost all of the candidates feel that campaign
expenses have gone down. However, the number
of "talent" candidates has risen rather than fallen.
Also, though small parties and independents were
thought to have been excluded from the system,
the number of mini -parties increased dramatically
and their electoral performance was consistent with
past elections.
Conclusions
The reVISIon bill of 1982 provides an excellent
example of how parties view election reform proposals from a purely selfish point of view.
Asahi
Shimbun summed up the decision-making process in
retrospect when it said that the debate in the Diet
consisted only of a 5tfscussion of party advantages
and disadvantages.
The newspaper continued
that it would be very hard to separate a political
party's position on an election system from the
advantages ~ disadvantages the party perceives it
will receive.
The newspaper shows how the events surrounding the many electoral revision attempts in
Japan all seem to concur with Duverger's theory
that a party will pursue its self-interest in trying'
to preserve or gain power. The question remains,
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how will this attitude affect future attempts at
election revision in Japan?
Further election revision is unlikely given the positions of the parties
today.
The LDP still desires single-member districts, and unless this proposal is modified in some
way to assure current LDP members that their
seats are safe and to serve the interests of some
of the other opposition parties, the proposal will
end up like its predecessors, the Hatoyama and
Tanaka proposals.
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WHERE AND WHY ARE MISREPORTERS
MISREPORTING?
Rick Malmgren*
Survey researchers are, of necessity, perennially concerned about the validity of survey
questions. It is often difficult, if not impossible,
to establish conclusively the validity of many
attitudinal and behavioral questions, but sometimes invalidity is blatant. For example, in every
National Election Study conducted by the University of Michigan Survey Research Center (SRC)
there has been a consistent over-report of voting
behavior. When the SRC's turnout rate is compared with the official election returns, the
survey derived data continually exceeds the
actual results, usually by more than 10 percent.
In 1968 Aage Clausen said "the consistency, as
well as the magnitude" of the discrepancy makes
it difficult t'1 explain away by sampling or response error.
Before the mid-1960s the question "did you
vote in the last general election?" was used to
divide voters from nonvoters, but because of
over-reporting in national surveys, many researchers doubted the validity of self-reporting.
In 1964 for the first time, self-reported voting
behavior was validated.
After the post-election
survey, the SRC field staff checked the accuracy
of self-reported voting behavior by examining the
official voting records in voting districts where
respondents lived. The skeptics' suspicions were
confirmed. Out of the 1,450 persons who re*Rick is a senior majoring in Political
Science.
During the past year he served as
president of Pi Sigma Alpha, Beta-Mu chapter,
and this summer he will be interning in the
Washington, D. C. 10th Circuit Court.
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ported to have voted, 112 could not be validated.
There were also 95 respondents who claimed to
have voted, but who would not give their names,
and another 73 for whom official voting records
were unavailable.
For these respondents validation was impossible, but there was prob2bly a
portion of misreporters among them as well.
It is important to exercise caution with this
misreporter figure for at least one major reason.
When validators checked voting records, they
assumed respondents were registered and voting
in the districts where the interviews took place.
It is quite possible that some of the misreporters
could have been registered at other addresses
and could have cast ballots there. Nevertheless,
it is clear that a significant number of respondents who claimed to have voted really did not
vote at all.

Since the 1964 voter validation, many other
election studies have also been validated. In the
Center for Political Studies (CPS) 1976 election
survey, Michael W. Traugott and John P. Katosh
claim the incidence of misreporting was quite
high.
It was found that 72 percent of those
interviewed reported voting, but only 61 percent
could be verified as having actually. cast ballots.
Of all thos
who reported voting, 14 percent
misreported. 3 In 1978 the CPS Election Study
included a question to determine where respondents were registered to vote.
For those who
reported not being registered at their home
addresses, correct registration addresses were
solicited. With this additional data, more accurate
validation was carried out by the CPS field staff,
and Lee Sigelman reports that misreporting was
once again over 10 percent. He reports that 12.8
percent of the total sample misreported, 23.4
percent of those who claimed to have voted.
Sigelman explains that in light of the prevalence
of misreporting, researchers "can no longer
afford to ignore this issue" because of the po-
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tential bias misreporters may introduce Jnto other
substantive findings in election studies.
According to several election studies, then,
the number of misreporters is not insignificant.
Of the many questions raised about misreporters,
the three most common and relevant questions are
these. First, what distinctive demographic characteristics, if any, do misreporters possess as a
group? Second, do misreporters hold any common
attitudes such as political efficacy, trust, or
citizen duty?
Third, are there any plausible
reasons to explain why misreporters misreport?
Or stated another way, what is the relationship
between demographic and attitudinal variables and
misreporting?
Although other timely questions
could be asked, I will limit my research to describing misreporters and developing a theory
about misreporting.
Using the University of Michigan Survey
Research Center 1980 National Election Study, I
I
will attempt to answer these three questions.
will define misreporters as those who claimed to
have voted in the 1980 general election, but for
whom no voting record was found. If respondents' registration records could not be found,
they will be left out of my study. Unfortunately
the SRC did not include a question in 1980 to
determine the addresses where respondents were
registered.
Therefore, when validating voting
behavior the field staff assumed respondents were
registered in the districts where interviews took
place. For respondents for whom no registration
records could be found, it is impossible to tell
who misreported and who was registered in some
other district.
Therefore, the entire group will
be excluded from my analysis. I will study only
those who were registered but did not vote
although they claimed to have voted. I will treat
the three questions in the order they are presented above, reporting first the results of past
election studies and then the findings from the
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1980 study. But before I proceed to a discussion
about demographic characteristics of misreporters,
I will present the extent of misreporting in 1980,
parallel data to those given above for past studies.
TABLE 1
RELA TIONSHIP BETWEEN SELF-REPOR TED AND
VALIDATED VOTING BEHAVIOR
Official Records
Voter
Self-report

Voter
Nonvoter

Nonvoter

778 (63)

61 ( 5)

5 (.4)

398 (32)

SRC 1980 National Election Study, n=1242, figures in parentheses are percentages.
Table 1 presents the validation data from the
1980 Election Study. Perhaps the most interesting figure on the table is the five people who
said they did not vote, but when the records
were checked, they had cast ballots.
Their
responses in the post-election survey are hard to
explain, but because their number is very small,
I will not study them. It is also interesting that
the percentage of misreporters in 1980 is less
than half that reported earlier by Clausen,
Traugott and Katosh, and Sigelman. The reason
for this low misreport rate is the exclusion of
respondents whose registration records could not
be found.
There were 444 such cases. If this
entire group were classified as misreporters, it
would yield a 27 percent misreport rate, which
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seems a bit high. The 1978 study (in which CPS
interviews asked where respondents were registered so the field staff could validate without
address guesswork) suggests that many, but not
all, of the no-registration-found cases were
misreporters.
I am confident that if it were
possible to divide this group, the misreport rate
in 1980 would be comparable to rates in previous
studies.
But the extent of misreporting is of
secondary importance in this project. I am more
concerned about common characteristics of misreporters and a theory of misreporting.
It is
important to acknowledge that this small number
of misreporters is a limitation to my conclusions.
Although scholars agree on the magnitude of
misreporting, there is certainly not unanimity
about the demographic characteristics of misreporters, but when several studies are examined
together it is possible to see a consensus.
Traugott and Katosh report that in 1976 neither
education nor sex was very strongly related to
whether or not a respondent was a misreporter.
Age, race, and income were related, however,
with the younger, nonwhite, and low-income
groups mor~ likely to misreport their registration
and voting.
In a later study they reported that
race was the strongest of these three variables,
while age and income were quite weak. Furthermore, they show that the age and income relationship virtua~y disappeared in the 1978 "off
year" election.
Traugott and Katosh seem to
conclude that the only strongly related demographic variable is race.
But at least two other scholars dispute
Traugott and Katosh's findings. Kim Q. Hill and
Patricia A. Hurley point out that one reason
Traugott and Katosh found such weak relationships is because they did "not discriminate liars
from
truthful nonvoters. "
Traugott's study
simply presents the percentag'e of various demographic groups
among misreporters, but the
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In Hill and Hurley's analysis of the 1976
SRC-CPS Election study they found that when all
three groups--valid voters, misreporters and
valid nonvoters--are compared, several interesting
characteristics show up among misreporters.
Misreporters appear to be closer to valid voters
than valid nonvoters in terms of race, sex,
education and occupational prestige. The pattern
that seems to emerge is that misreporters are
demographically between truthful voter~ and
truthful nonvoters but closer to the voters.
Lee
Sigelman comes to a similar but weaker conclusion
in his analysis of the 1978 election.
Using
discriminant analysis he decides that "misreporters are a cross between actual voters and admitted nonvoters, though they bear a slightly grlfater resemblance to the former than the latter."
Another
researcher,
Herbert
Weisberg,
offers another reason why Traugott did not find
education to be related to misreporting. Traugott
presents the percentage of all respondents in
three education levels that misreported. But if
college-level education has a low nonvoter rate,
then it will erroneously appear that collegeeducated voters have a low misreport rate. It is
more revealing to show the percentage of nonvoters who misreport at the three education
levels.
With this analysis Weisberg finds a
24 percent difference between misreporters with
high -school versus college education.
While
48 percent of college educated nonvoters misreported, only 24 percent of the high-school
10
educated falsified their votes.
Weisberg also
found several other relationships.
He suggests
that misreporters are most likely to be collegeeducated, high-income, middle-aged, Democrat
males.
To make sure that these later relationships are not just "artifacts" of education,
Weisberg controlled for education and found all
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the si€fnificant differences to remain except income.
Most scholars agree that misreporters seem
to possess some distinct demographic characteristics, and my analysis of the 1980 Election Study
reveals many of the same relationships. Table 2
presents a comparison of truthful voters, truthful
nonvoters, and misreporters in terms of several
demographic variables.
Contrary to the results
of some earlier studies, neither sex nor race
appear to be related to misreporting. These data
show almost equal proportions of each sex and
racial category among the three types of voters.
One of the most interesting demographic variables
is education.
TABLE 2
DEMOGRAPHIC COMPARISON
Percentage of

Attribute

Valid
Voter
(n=778)

Valid
Nonvoter Misreporter
(n=61)
(n=398)

Sex
Male
Female

45
55

41
59

42
57

Race
White
Nonwhite

90
10

84
16

85
15

Education
College
Noncollege

45
55

23
77

34
66
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TABLE 2 (con't)
Percentage of

Attribute

Valid
Voter
(n=778 )

Age
18-25
26-35
36-45
46-

10
22
19
49

24
28
13
35

15
15
16
54

Income
$0 - 9,999
10,000 - 14,999
15,000 - 19,999
20,000 - 24,999
25,000 - 49,999
50,000 -

19
15
12
17
20
17

37
16
13
14
12
8

34
15
9
9
11
21

Party Identification
Democrat
Republican
Independent

42
30
28

47
20
33

44
31
25

Social Status
Lower
Working
Middle

0.2
44
56

0.2
62
38

0
62
38

Valid
Nonvoter Misreporter
(n=398 )
(n=61)

SRC 1980 National Election Study
The 1980 results mirror those found by Hill and
Hurley in 1976 and Sigelman in 1978 in that
misreporters are1fetween voters and nonvoters in
education level.
Approaching half of all validated voters attended at least one year of college
while less than 25 percent of validated nonvoters
had gone past high school.
Misreporters are
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almost midway between these, but a little closer
to voters.
Age is another variable that is clearly related to misreporting.
Misreporters resemble
actual voters more closely in age than in education. While 32 and 30 percent of validated voters
and misreporters are 35 years of age or younger,
over half of nonvoters fit this category.
This
suggests that misrI~orters are not as young as
Traugott suggests.
Over half of all misreporters are over 45 years of age. This is about the
same as the percentage of voters over 45, but it
is much higher than nonvoters who are older than
45.
While party identification is not related to
misreporting, income and social status appear to
be related in the opposite way that education and
age are. The average income level of misreporters is between voters and nonvoters, but this
time misreporters are closer to nonvoters than
voters. Among validated voters only 46 percent
are below the 20 thousand dollar income level, yet
20 percent more nonvoters are in this category;
misreporters are only 8 percentage points below
nonvoters.
In social class, nonvoters and misreporters literally come together though.
Virtually identical proportions of these two groups
are in each social class.
Summarizing the demographic characteristics
of misreporters, it appears they are close to
actual voters in terms of age and education, yet
they are close to nonvoters in terms of income
and social status. This information will be useful
later when I present a theory about misreporting
behavior.
Sex, race, and· party identification
appear to have no relationship to misreporting.
While it is interesting to study the demographic characteristics of misreporters, equally or
more interesting are the relationships between
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various attitudinal variables and misreporting.
Reviewing the results of post-election studies, the
1976 Traugott and Katosh report is once again an
anomaly in that it is the only report that finds
virtually no differer.fe between misreporters and
other respondents.
However, in thier 1978
study they report relationships between misreporting and efficacy and party identification although
the pal5isan relationship was found to be insignificant.
They report that those scoring high on
the efficacy scale were less likely to misreport
and Democrats were slightly more likely to misreport than Republicans. As was the case with
demographic variables, other researchers have
detected stronger relationships. Hill and Hurley
found "a consistent pattern which show[ ed] liars
to
have
relatively
high
levels
of
interest in politics" as well as high levels of
efficacy. Misreporters were also much more likely
than valid nonvoters to express intentions to
vote, concern about which party wins the1eresidency, and strong party identification.
In
order to show that misreporters were not simply
giving socially desirable answers to these questions--after all, they did on voting behavior
questions--Hill and Hurley also compared the
three types of voters on knowledge of politics.
Misreporters were much more likely to know which
party had control of Congress an~ which party
had elected the most congressmen.
This tends
to SUbstantiate the idea that misreporters are
well-informed, efficacious, partisan individuals.
Sigelman also reports that in 1978 discriminant
analysis on important
attitudinal variables-political interest and emotional involvement for
example--places
misreporters
between
actual
voters ftrd truthful nonvoters, a little closer to
voters.
Turning to the 1980 Election Study we find
results similar to those reported by Hill and
Hurley and Sigelman.
Table 3 shows that in
many of the important attitudinal variables, voters
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TABLE 3
ATTITUDE CHARACTERISTICS COMPARED
Percentage of
Question
How much interest
in campaign?
Very Much
Somewhat
Not Much

Validated Validated
Voters Nonvoters lViisreporters

40

11

46

40
49

14

Did respondent view
any television programs about campaign
Yes
90
No
10
Does respondent intend
to vote?
Yes
99
No
1
People like me have no
say in government.
Agree
33
Disagree
67
Does respondent trust
government?
Always
2
22
Most times
Sometimes
73
Never
3

75

35
45
20

24

90
10

38

97

62

3

56

37
63

44

3

o

23

25

70
5

72
3
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Table 3 (con't)
Percentage of

Question

Validated Validated
Voters Nonvoters Misreporters

Will respondent vote
even if does not
care about outcome?
Yes
No

42
58

70

34

Has respondent attended a political
meeting during the
campaign?
Yes
11
No
89

01
99

13
87

Has respondent contributed to a political
candidate?
8
Yes
92
No

2
98

92

Strength of pary
identification.
Strong Democrat
Weak Democrat
Independent
Weak Republican
Strong Republican
Apolitical

66

20
20
32
17

9
27

42

12

11
0.5

4
6

30

8

21
18
33
15
13

o

SRC 1980 National Election Study
and misreporters are closely related while verified
nonvoters are significantly different.
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It is not surprIsmg that over 85 percent of
validated voters expressed at least somewhat of
an interest in the campaign, but it is very interesting that a full 80 percent of misreporters did
as well. Only 51 percent of validated nonvoters
were at least somewhat interested.
Identical
proportions of voters and misreporters were
attentive to campaign programs on television while
nonvoters lagged a full 15 percentage points
behind.
And when asked whether respondents
intended to vote, the gap between nonvoters and
the other two groups opened further.
Almost
every voter, and misreporter expressed an intention to vote, while only 30 percent of validated
nonvoters planned to vote.

Table 3 includes three questions that indicate feelings of internal efficacy, political trust,
and citizen duty of respondents. The similarity
between validated voters and misreporters shows
up in their feelings of efficacy and citizen duty
with only 4 percentag'e points between them in
each category.
Nonvoters are about 20 percentage points behind.
But the distinction between
the three groups disappears with trust for government.
Almost three-fourths of all three
groups trust government only sometimes, and the
differences between any of the groups is not more
than 3 percent in any trust category.
Two questions that show the political activity
of respondents--one dealing with attending political meetings and the other with campaign contributions--were included with attitudinal variables.
It appears that these indicators present a high
activity threshold for most people questioned, for
almost 90 percent in every category are inactive.
But, even given the low activity rate, misreporters appear to be at least as active as nonvoters.
In strength of party identification the only pattern that emerges is the concentration of nonvoters toward the center of the scale.
Nonvoters
are disproportionately independent and apolitical.
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Misreporters and voters, on the other hand, are
more evenly distributed across the partisan
spectrum with virtually no apolitical feelings.
For most of the attitudes listed in Table 3,
misreporters appear to be remarkably close to
actual voters. It could be argued, however, that
these questions present socially desirable alternatives much like the original question on voting
behavior. Perhaps a person who would lie about
voting would also lie about intending to vote and
interest in the campaign. It is interesting that
the question that differentiates least between the
three types of voters--political trust--is the
question with the least temptation to choose an
attractive alternative because there really is no
attractive alternative. If this is the case, the
attitude variables tell us virtually nothing about
misreporters.
As mentioned earlier, Hill and
Hurley were also concerned about this in their
1976 study, but in two ways this theory seems to
break down. First, the last question in Table 5
is one that measures external efficacy.
This
question should draw the same socially desirable
responses, yet here misreporters expressed very
low efficacy. Surely those who would claim their
votes count for socially desirable reasons would
also claim the political system is not too complicated to understand for the same reasons.
Second, Table 4 shows the response rate to a
question about knowledge of politics.
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TABLE 4
COMPARISON OF KNOWLEDGE OF POLITICS
Percentage of
Question

Validated Validated
Voters Nonvoters Misreporters

Does respondent
know which party
controls Congress?
Yes
98
No
2

93

98

7

2

SRC 1980 National Election Study
This question shows misreporters to be as informed about politics as actual voters, with
nonvoters less informed.
While there are only
5 percentage points difference between nonvoters
and the other two groups, this margin is probably quite wide for a question whose answer is
almost universally known.
This is indicated by
the high "yes" response. Even if this relationship is not statistically significant, I believe it
has sUbstantive significance.
It is probably safe, then, to give credibility
to the data presented in Table 3 and conclude
that there is a relationship between misreporting
and many attitudinal variables.
In particular,
misreporters tend to be like voters and different
from nonvoters in campaign interest, intentions to
vote, efficacy, citizen duty, political activity,
strength of partisanship and knowledge of
politics.
Some of these characteristics may be
helpful in trying to explain why people misreport.
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So far the findings I have presented from
various studies have been descriptive, a sort of
demographic-attitudinal portrait of misreporters.
But one of the most important questions about
misreporting is "why do people misreport?"
Researchers have known for years that voting
behavior qlWstions present socially desirable
temptations;
respondents want to be able to say
they voted whether they actually did or not. But
this explanation falls short because it does not
explain why some people respond to the social
pressure and others do not.
Hill and Hurley
tested the hypothesis that misreporters are simply
those who forget their behavior. They observed
the frequency of misreporting as post-election
surveys were conducted further from the time of
the election, but no increase
misreporting wa~
found as more time elapsed.
Weisberg claims
the key to understanding why people misreport
voting behavior :H~.inges. on the question of which
types of people"
misreport. With the descriptive statistics on 1980 misreporters, I can now
attempt to answer this question.

itT

Various theories have been developed about
misreporting, most of w~ch are variations of the
social pressure theory.
Hill and Hurley also
present a theory based on social pressure, what
might be called a social-mobility theory. According to their 1981 study, people misreport in
response to pressure placed on them by incongruous social settings. Misreporters are much like
voters in the variables that indicate a high probability of voting such as high education, high
political knowledge, and high efficacy.
But
misreporters also appear to be unlike voters in
age, income and occupational status. This suggests a life cycle effect of misreporting.
Misreporting, the theory goes, is more common
among those who are on their way up the incomeoccupational ladder.
They are subject to the
same social pressures as well-educated voters,
but they are younger and poorer, and these are

MIS REPORTERS MISREPORTING

47

variables that tend to inhibit voting. 23
This
theory explains the phenomenon of misreporting in
a plausible way except for one troublesome variable:
age.
Although Hill and Hurley found
misreporters to be young, the 1980 study shows
them to be disproportionately middle-a~~d and
Weisberg's study confirms this finding.
The
fact that middle-aged people misreport more than
the young limits Hill and Hurley's theory but does
not dispose of it. The most plausible explanation
of misreporting captures the essence of their
theory--that misreporting is caused by pressure
from an incongruous social setting--but denies the
"life cycle effect."
I will call this the crosspressure theory of misreporting.
Raymond Wolfinger and Steven Rosenstone
reject the usefulness of a similar cross-pressure
theory that has been used to try to explain who
votes.
They claim there is no evidence that
conflicting social pressures are responsible for
dete~ining who goes to the polls on election
day.
But explaining who votes is wholly different from explaining who misreports. The 1980
National Election Study provides evidence to
support
the
cross-pressure
theory
of
misreporting.
Much
of this
evidence
was
presented in Tables 2 and 3.
Earlier we found that misreporters tend to
be educated closer to the level of voters than to
that of nonvoters and Wolfinger and Rosenstone
found education to 2ffe the single most useful
predictor of voting.
One reason for this may
be that education tends to increase a person's
feelings of political efficacy and citizen duty.
Accordingly, we also found that misreporters have
high feelings of efficacy and duty.
Similarities
between voters and misreporters in these and
other ways (see Tables 2 and 3) probably subject
misreporters to the same social pressures to vote
that draw actual voters
to
the
polls.
In
support of this idea, . Weisberg points out that
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the groups with a high degree of misreporting 2,re
also the groups with the highest turnout rate.
But in other areas misreporters are not like
voters at all.
We found that in income level
misreporters are much closer to nonvoters than to
voters. This suggests that misreporters' income
levels do not match their education levels. On
one hand they are well educated and feel political
efficacy, but on the other, they are in low-income
brackets, which likely affects their social standing. This is supported by the fact that misreporters identified with the working class in the exact
same proportions as nonvoters. This is a clear
example of cross-pressure faced by misreporters.
According to this analysis then,
most
misreporters are probably of two types: first,
people who feeling strongly that they should
vote, but who do not receive the voting cues and
support from a large part of their social
environment.
These may be people in the
working class who associate with other nonvoting
workers.
They probably don't get long lunch
hours on election days nor reminders to vote in
pay packets before elections.
The second type
are people who truly intended to vote, but were
legitimately prevented from attending the polls.
These people probably feel justified in saying
they voted because they would have voted if at
all possible. Other variables in Table 3 also seem
to support the cross-pressure theory.
As
pointed out earlier, voters and misreporters were
both 15 percent more attentive to television
programs
dealing
with
the
campaign
than
nonvoters, and misreporters also expressed much
more of an interest in the campaign. These two
characteristics are probably functions of the
higher education level of misreporters, but they
will most likely constitute additional pressures to
vote.
Table 5 presents variables that further
support the crosspressure theory.
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TABLE 5
COMPARISON OF SELECT ATTITUDINAL
AND DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES
Percentage of
Attribute or
Question

Validated Validated
Voters Nonvoters Misreporters

Did anyone attempt
to influence respondent's vote during
campaign?
Yes
No

47
53

65

52
48

22

36

78

64

68

79

79

32

21

21

Did respondent attempt
to influence anyone's
vote during the
campaign?
Yes
43
No
57
Is politics too
complicated to
understand?
Yes
No

35

After explaining that many misreporters are
part of the working class and that they receive
far less encouragement to vote from a large part
of their social environment, it may seem like a
contradiction to show that misreporters are much
more likely than nonvoters to engage in political
dialogue. This tendency is indicated in the first
two questions in Table 5. The important point is
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that while many misreporters deal with an apolitical environment they are not apolitical. As shown
in Table 3 they are interested and active in the

campaign, they are relatively strong partisans,
and they usually intend to vote. It is consistent
then that they engage in a high degree of political dialogue.
This dialogue is probably another
force that gives them a feeling of the importance
of voting and leads them to misreport when they
fail to cast a ballot. The last variable in Table 5
shows an interesting barrier to misreporter voting. Earlier I explained that misreporters, like
voters, possess a high degree of internal political
efficacy. The variable presented in Table 5 is a
measure of external efficacy and the results are
quite different. While misreporters are closer to
voters in internal efficacy, they are identical to
nonvoters in external efficacy. Misreporters feel
their votes count, but they also feel politics is
too complicated to understand clearly.
This is
another characteristic that places misreporters in
the group they belong and not in the group they
claim to be part of. External efficacy, income,
and social status are characteristics that tend to
inhibit misreporters from voting.
Education,
internal efficacy, and citizen duty are characteristics that tend to give misreporters a sense of
the importance of their votes.
When people in
this situation respond to their pro-vote tendencies
and participate on election day. we call them
validated voters. But when they fail to vote for
any number of reasons, their pro-vote tendencies
compel them to deny their failure.
One of the questions I have tried to answer
is one proposed by Lee Sigelman: "Are misreporters more like what they claim to ~e--voters--or
what they actually are--nonvoters?"
In addition
to this I have developed a theory to explain why
misreporters misreport.
I have found that in
demographic
and
attitudinal
characteristics,
misreporters are "more like what they claim to
be--voters. "
These
characteristics give the
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voting process and politics in general a sense of
importance to misreporters. But misI'eporter,; also
possess some characteristics that tend to inldbit
their voting behavior. This mixture of characteristics gives rise to the cross-pressure theory of
misreporting. Misreporters seem to live in environments that give conflicting messages about
voting. When people who live in these conditions
make it to the polls, we classify them with the
voters and take no further notice of them. When
they fail to make it to vote on election day, their
strong feelings of efficacy and citizen duty lead
them to misreport their behavior. This theory is
supported by findings from several other election
studies as well as the SRC 1980 National Election
Study. But the two questions I've addressed are
not the only questions that should be asked about
misreporting. Although it is a topic beycr..cl the
scope of this project, the subject of further
research should be other possible biases introduced into election studies as a result of misreporting.
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INFITAH AND THE MODERNIZATION
OF EGYPT

CHRIS MONSON*
In trod uction
A t the secondary school, I came to
realize for the first time what city
dwellers were and what class officers
meant. . . . My classmates were naturally better dressed than I was but I
never suffered because of this. Many
of my friends came from wealthy families
and lived in luxurious houses, yet I
cannot recall l.ver wishing to possess
what they had.
--Anwar el-Sadat
This early memory, in contrast later with
Sadat's aggressive wish for foreign investment, is
characteristic of the change that not only influenced the career of the late President Sadat, but
also the change of a country.
This change
became known as infitah. The term infitah (Arabic) means reaching upward and outward.
It
became the term commonly used for the "1974
October paper" in which Sadat offered an economic cure for the ills of Egypt. Infitah--the Open
Door Policy--described a post-socialist policy, an
opening up of the Egyptian economy to direct
private investment. This paper does not try to
reconstruct the
policy in detail, but rather
*Chris is a senior majoring in Political
Science, and has studied in Israel and Egypt for
six months. Last fall he worked as the administrative assistant for the United Palestinian
Appeal in Washington, D. C.
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it focuses on the effects of such a policy--more

specifically, the impact of infitah on the modernization and economic development of Egypt
during Sadat's Open Door Policy era of 1974-1981.
Development can be very difficult to define
precisely. However, in focusing this discussion,
the following definitions are offered as a guide to
the reader: Development is defined as the capacity to stimulate demands and to solve problems
based on the effective use of new technology,
skill, and functionality. Modernization, a subset
of development, is the actual formation of new
adaptive roles in a system to prevent a population--that has tasted the fruits of development
(technology, s~, and functionality)--from slipping backwards.
Once modernization has begun, it tends to
become a pervasive, disruptive, and painful process. As a result, those who lead out and push
for modernization often lose the ability to control
and regulate this process.
The intent of this
paper is to illustrate the inability of the Egyptian
government to change to new adaptive roles to
assimilate and properly absorb the great influx of
technology and industrialization resulting from
infitah.
Because of the broad nature of this topic,
discussion has been limited to three general
sectors: effects upon (1) agricultural development, (2) industrial/manufacturing development,
and (3) trade and financial development. A basic
assumption is made that most of the economic
influence during the period of 1974-1981 has come
from the West, although other influences certainly
have been present from Arab and Eastern Bloc
countries. It is not the purpose of this paper to
discuss the political nature of leadership, the
Camp David Peace Treaty, or the sale of military
arms.
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Background
The formal adoption of the Open Door Policy
(infitah) was not forced upon Egypt by capitalistic investors nor by international Western creditors. The Policy was chosen in light of internal
economic and external political factors.
Sadat's
own words best describe the seriousness of some
of these factors:
So that I can give you an idea of
what the opening is all about, I must
go back to the fourth of Ramadan of
last year [October 1, 1973], six days
before the battle.
I invited to this
same house in which we are now seated
the members of the National Security
Council . . . and I laid before them the
situation and asked them to advance
their own opinions. . . .
We debated
for a long time. There were some who
advocated fighting, and others who said
we were not ready. . . . At the end I
said that I wanted to tell them one
thing only, that as of that day we had
reached the "zero stage" economically in
every sense of the term.
What this
meant in concrete terms was that I
could not have paid a penny toward our
debt installments falling due on January 1 [1974]; nor could I have bought
a grain of wheat in 1974.
There
wouldn't have been bread for the
people,
tj"lat's
the least
one
can
say . . .
In addition to these problems, Egypt was at
that time,. and still is, plagued by a serious
population explosion. Every 20 seconds an Egyptian baby is born; 180 every hour; 4,320 every
day. There are currently over 46 million people
in Egypt.
Current fertility rates continue to
grow at 3 percent per year, and it is estimated
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that b~ the year 2000 there will be over 76
Sadat undoubtedly understood the
million.
magnitude of such a problem and realized that
foreign investment and aid were the best alternatives. The announcement of the Open Door Policy
in 1974 provided relief from the country's failure
to achieve a truly socialist economy.
External political factors also added pressure
to change and to open up to outside investment.
Egypt could not afford another war and Western
aid remained tied to promoting a peaceful dialogue
with Israel.
Thus we see the Camp David accords emerging as a partial result of the need for
(the Open Door Policy). Western aid and investment.
Now that a brief setting has been established
for infitah, an outline of what the policy actually
is will be helpful.
Infitah --The Open Door Policy
a.

Law No. 43 of 1974
• provIsIOn for opening the Egyptian
economy to foreign and Arab direct
investment in almost every field.
• proVIsIOn against
confiscation.

nationalization

and

• tax exemption that lasts for five
years, and which may extend to eight
years "if warranted by public interest"; and a 10-year tax exemption,
which may extend to 15 years, for
reconstruction projects.
• companies established under this law
are considered private companies.
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• provIsIon for tariff-free and duty-free
imports on machinery, equipment and
raw materials.

b.

The new import-export law of 1975
• provides for the importation of certain
goods to be open to the private sector
as well as to the public sector.
• machinery, equipment and raw materials--the basic items of any investment program or development plan--are
now imported by the private sector.

c.

Foreign Exchange Law No. 97 of 1976
• provides
for
the
liberalization of
foreign exchange transactions outside
of Egypt.
• freedom to keep the foreign exchange
acquired from any source whatever.

d.

The own-import system
• provides for anyone who has foreign
exchange resources to use them to
import directly, without having' to go
through the Egyptian banking system.

e.

Phasing out of bilateral trade agreements to allow market
forces to
dominate in shaping the foreign trade
picture.

f.

Restructuring the public sector so that
public organizations are abolished to
make ~ay for private enterprise capitalism.
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Agriculture

The Open Door Policy has caused some
drastic changes in the Egyptian agricultural
sector. When investment regulations relaxed for
many of the sectors of the Egyptian economy,
both foreign and domestic investors shifted to
those areas that would bring them the highest
return.
This caused both public and private
investment in agriculture to fall from about 25
percent in thli mid-1960s to an estimated 7 percent in 1977.
Agricultural investment did not
actually decrease in dollar amount; it just did not
get a very large share of the millions as compared
to other sectors.
This was far from the midpoint projected goal of 13 percent to be invested
in agriculto/e (according to Egypt's 10-year plan,
1973-1982).
World Bank average annual growth
rate indicators reveal the effects of this change
in another way: From 1960-1969 the growth rate
for agricultural production was 2.9 percent,
contrasting a drop to 2.7 percent for the period
8
of 1970-1979.
The slide in Egyptian agriculture
became apparent in 1974, when the government
was forced to embark on a major food importation
program.
Although the total amount of agricultural
investment as a percentage had dropped, as just
mentioned, the total dollar amount still increased
significantly. But the Western-invested increase
yielded lower production.
Chiefly to blame was
the low agricultural investment level. The Open
Door Policy lured investors away from agriculture
and into the more profitable sectors of tourism
and industry.
To meet the demands of over 45 million
people, Egypt has had to increase both food
imports and food subsidy aid from Western countries. The pressure on farmers for results is
very real: Self-sufficient less than 10 years ago,
Egypt now has to import half of its food, at an

r
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estimated cost in 1983 of almost $4 billion.
As
well as injecting more funds, the government has
recently raised producer prices for corn, rice,
and wheat, thus reversing a years-old policy of
forcing farmers to sell their crops at less than
market prices to provide city dwellers with cheap
food.
However, such innovations have come a little
too late to provide incentive for the struggling
farmer.
For example,
government subsidies
provide a price monopoly controlled by the government that forces farmers to keep their prices
competitive.
In a recent 10-year period (19711980), profits decreased substantially for farmers
raising crops that were heavily subsidized to the
public. The net effect has been that some farmers have turned to more profitable crops like
fruits, vegetables, and animal fodder (clover),
while other farmers have given up and migrated
to the urban centers for different employment.
Over a period of 10 years (1971-1980), animal
fodder alone rgplaced wheat in crop area as much
as 32 percent.
The mechanization of farms has also had both
good and bad effects. Since 1973, the Open Door
Policy has caused tractor imports to quadruple.
Some areas have almost completely done away with
old methods. In the Sharqiyya province, land
preparation and threshing are almost entirely
mechanized; plowing is over 85 percent mechruro
ized and irrigation pumping nearly 75 percE:nt.
There is no question that such technical change
brings about important benefits; yet, statistics
show that land yield has not increased.
The impressive mechanization statistics do
not account for the lack of spare parts, mechanics, and repair shops in rural areas. There is a
general shortage of spare parts, and local manufacturers do not maintain an inventory of parts,
but manufacture them on demand. As a result,
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farmers often wait three to six months for repairs. Farm animals continue to provide a kind
of insurance for equipment.
In addition, the
working of dairy animals reduces the yield on
?airy pr~?ucts that mechanization had hoped to
Increase.
Yield gains as much as 15 percent were
expected from deeper and better ground tillage
from mechanization.
However, at the present,
farmers plough no deeper with tractor ploughs
than they do with animal ploughs. Furthermore,
mechanization was to intensify the timing of crop
planting to obtain the ultimate yield, but low
price policies currently push 25 percent of crop
production later than its optimal planting time in
order for farpers to get the best price return for
their crops.
The severity of these facts is intensified by
the fact that Egypt's population has more than
tripled in this century alone, yet the area of
cultivated land has remained by and large the
same. In many areas prime farmland continues to
lose out to urban and village sprawl. Still to be
resolved is the argument of whether to concentrate on traditional farming lands along the Nile
and in the Delta, or to broaden into costly land
reclamation. A report submitted by the Ministry
of Agriculture and Food Security in 1982 concluded that agricultural output could be tripled by
the year 2000 through better use of traditional
lands; many senior planners, however, seem
reluctant to relinquish the Sadat Administration's
dream of massive desert conversion. In the 1960s
more than 900,000 feddan (934,200 acres) were
reclaimed--at an average cost of $4,000 per feddan--but much of this has reverted to barren
desert.
What remains constitutes 13 percent of
cultivated land'13but accounts for only 2 percent
of total output.
that

The Egyptian Ministry of Planning estimated
more than a million extra tons of wheat and
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over half a million extra tons of rice and maize
would be needed per year by the mid-1980s.
This is expected to increase demand for imports
from the West. It has been estimated that grain
production alone fell about 4 percent per capita
during the 1970s, while grr!n consumption rose
per capita almost 9 percent.
Unless this trend
can be contained, mechanization will be plagued
by the increased pressure of the one million new
mouths to feed every eight months. Whatever the
answer--and it is not likely to be self-sufficiency--time is not on the Egyptian farmer's side.
Industry iManufacturing
Western influence on industry and manufacturing grew to new heights when Open Door
Policy Law 43 was passed in 1974.
This new
policy allows foreig'n firms to bring in equipment
without having to pay a tariff. Other incentives
under Law 43 include customs yields and 10-year
tax holiday concessions to foreign firms that link
up with Egyptian partners. By 1980, new foreign
private investment (majority Western) reached
about $400 million a year, compared with $100
million just three years earlier.
In addition to
private investment, economic assistance by governments and international organizations have
played a significant role.
For example, in 1980
the United States contributed $1.2 billion, the
World Bank fund donated $450 million, West
Germany contributef's $150 million, and Japan
funded $170 million.
This aid, totalling nearly
$2 billion per year, has given rise to a rapid
industrial-manufacturing boom overlapping into all
the economic sectors of the country. The soaring
investment and aid have produced impressive
production
indicators.
The
averag'e
annual
growth rate for industry has rIsen from 5.4
percent in 1960-1969 to 6.8 percent in 1970-1979.
Manufacturing has even greater results: 4.8
percent in 1960-1969 to an average annual growth
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rate of 8 percent in 1970-1979. 16 The growth in
industry also has a considerable effect on labor
statistics. By 1980, industry and manufacturing
were employing over O percent of the Egyptian
1r
working population.
That amounts to over
eight million jobs.
In addition to this, over 1,000 new projects
are scheduled to go into operation by 1984,
employing an additional 160,000 Egyptians. More
than 200 American companies have a corporate
presence t~ Egypt, with an addition of 50 firms
per year.
Despite all this, however, the payoff from
the Open Door Policy hasn't been as large as
Sadat would have liked. Although the midpoint
goal for private investment under Egypt's 10-year
plan ($400 million) has been realized, many companies are beginning to be frightened off by
bureaucratic bottlenecks. Realizing this potential
bureaucratic paralysis, Sadat created the Investment Authority to encourage foreign investment
by coordinating intra-government efforts.
But
the task has often become insurmountable. The
government has over 20 ministries whose functions
overlap.
This creates occasional inability of
government organizations to honor commitments
because of unclear lines of authority and competing inter-agency interests and policy claims.
Such power struggles are extremely damaging to the government's credibility in foreign
eyes.
For example, one large U. S. company
considering a tomato processing joint venture was
told by Agriculture Ministry officials that the
public sector was the only avenue open to the
company. Government policy, it was later discovered, favored private sector joint ventures. The
Agricultural Ministry had taken the initiative to
promote a public joint venture that was to its
advantage'19leaving the investor with misplaced
directives.
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Another critical area of bureaucratic paralysis in which the battle is not yet won--or even
properly engaged--is with the customs authority.
Approximately 90 percent of the country's imports
arrive through the port city of Alexandria.
There are three competing bureaucracies governing the import and export of goods: the Finance
Ministry, which formulates tariffs and is responsible for classification; the Investment Authority,
which negotiates Law 43 exemptions; and the
Customs Service, which often ignores both the
Finance Ministry and the Investment Authority,
and interprets the regulations as it sees fit.
Although Law 43 specifically states that foreign
firms may bring in plant equipment without paying any tariff whatsoever, customs officers have
been known to routinely say: "I do not recognize
that interpretation; those who do not pay the
required fee f6ill see their equipment collect dust
on the pier."
The greatest problem the potential investor
meets is finding a clear authority with which to
deal. The General Authority for Investment and
Free Zones, under the supervision of the Ministry
of Economy, is supposed to have the last word on
conditions under which foreign companies operate
in Egypt.
However, the foreign company must
also have its project approved by the ministry
directly involved in its activity.
For example,
the Ministry of Industry competes constantly with
the Ministry of Economy for decision-making
power.
Although there continues to be more
coordination at the cabinet level, these two ministries and others continue to pull in different
directions when it comes to deciding hO~land with
whom a foreign company should operate.
The Egyptian ministries have to deal not
only with pure industrial assembly line companies--such as Ford, Xerox, and Coca-Cola--but
also with the even more imposing growth in the
closely related tourism and construction indus-
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tries. Statistics reveal that although pure industry and manufacturing annual growth levels are
impressive, growth in the service sector (tourism)
is the highest of all. Service sector production
for 1960-1969 was 4.7 percent, while in 1970-1979
it rose to ~~ percent--the largest growth rate of
all sectors.
It came as no surprise that Western investment sought out the most financially
attractive projects. By 1977, over 25 percent of
foreign investment was in housing, tourism, and
construction--well above any percentage for
industry. It was argued that luxury housing was
an essential means of attracting foreign currency
(tourism). However, the surge by the West in
luxury construction has had some far-reaching
side effects.
First, powerful developers have obtained
priority on building materials and have absorbed
the already-low supply of materials for their
luxury projects. Regular housing project developers, who were assured by the government that
luxury construction would not be importing most
of their supplies, are continually cut out of
business because of the shortage. Thus, luxury
construction for the few is built at the expense of
regular or economic housing projects for the
many. Second, large-scale building projects have
caused substan tial price increases for middleincome housing, creating a greater shift toward 2~
demand on rent-controlled housing for the poor.
Both these factors compound a serious housing
shortage for Egypt's urban population explosion.
A walk through the streets and hotel lobbies of
Cairo reveal the seriousness of the housing
shortage. For example, an early-morning departure from a Cairo hotel will discover the sleeping
bodies of homeless porters, busboysZ4 clerks, and
cooks strewn across the lobby floor.
Lack of skill and the inbility to adapt to
modern manufacturing methods is another problem
resulting from rapid modernization. A look at the
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Egyptian textile industry provides a clear example
of this dilemma. Egypt's long-time staple, cotton,
is of very high quality and is exported for its
use in high-quality fabric at an extremely favorable rate for the economy. The main input for
Egypt's textile factories is the same high-quality
cotton. Domestic textile plants as of yet have not
been able to manufacture more than a coursegrade product.
Western technology has been
hampered by the low training capacity of laborers.
Textile manufacturers also suffer from
excess waste during the production of combed
yarn: as much as 20 percent per year is lost
because of incompetent laborers, though inadequate supervision and negligence gn the part of
2
management have also been blamed.
An additional problem the newly developing
Egyptian economy has to battle is inappropriate
technology. Relaxed import rules from the Open
Door Policy have brought thousands of goods into
Egypt that are too sophisticated for the average
consumer.
This problem has brought about the
creation of Egypt's Engineering and Industrial
Design Development Centre (EIDDC).
EIDDC
redesigns products to find a balance between
sophisticated,
imported
Western
technology,
Egyptian industry, and local demand. The head
of Egypt's EIDDC, Yusef Mazhar, gives the
following useful example:
take the fully automatic
washing machine found in most Western
homes.
In Egypt, this machine is
impractical.
It costs $1,000, a sum
probably equivalent to the annual salary
of
a
typical
middle-class
worker.
Coupled with the drawback of high
initial cost, are the inevitable problems
of improper maintenance and scarcity of
spare parts generally found in developing countries. These mean that the
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washing machine is likely to remain idle
for long periods of time.
More significant, however, is the
fact that the fully automatic washing
machine is too sophisticated for the
Egyptian market. The Egyptian housewife does not have the problem of
trying to save time and effort like her
Western counterpart. Very few need a
washing machine that they can turn on
when they leave home in the morning
and empty out when they return home.
Instead, with time to spare and
different life-styles . . . the washing
machine
designed
by
EIDDC...
carries out the same cleaning functions
as its Western equivalent. But nothing
on it, including the water supply, is
automated.
It doesn't matter that a
maid has to pour water into our washing machine with a bucket. It achieves
the same result. . . 2~t less than
one-fifth the initial cost.

Another example illustrates this' point in yet
another way. A large Egyptian firm assembling
buses under license from a West German company
wanted to subcontract seats locally rather than
have the seats imported. The design called for
more than 350 individual parts.
However, the
bus firm could not find anyone in Cairo capable
of the task.
EIDDC took the plans and came
back with specifications reduced to 60 parts. The
seat was therhable to be produced locally as were
other parts.
Although these examples shine
light on the problem of inappropriate technology,
they are but a small dent in the vast amount of
potential products that could be manufactured in
Egypt.
Just before his death, President Sadat
expressed the dream that he would live to see the
day when every product sold locally bore the
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label "Made in Egypt. ,,28
The late President's
dream still remains, on a large scale, highly unreachable in the near future.
Ironically, President Sadat's Open Door Policy fuelled consumption
and encouraged imports to the point of discouraging the possibilities of large-scale local production.
Goods and products manufactured in
highly-skilled foreign markets were more profitable for investors.
Trade and Finance
This section will highlight some of the dilemmas not previously discussed and then bring
together the two main arguments against liberalization of trade.
The implementors of the Open Door Policy
have realized by now that they are involved in a
far more difficult and sophisticated process than
originally anticipated. For example, the exchange
rate policy, designed earlier to shelter industrial
development and to protect consumer prices, had
to be changed to clarify price signalling. Interest rate policies, which had been tailored to
direct resources toward favored economic sectors,
needed reconstructing to promote domestic savings
and to distribute capital more competitively. Tax
policies had to be revamped to provide necessary
equity protection during changing economic incentives.
The interrelationships of public and
private sector investments became more complex
as the private sector was stimulated toward direct
coml2~tition with the already-defensive public sector.
The ability of Egyptian economic leaders to
manage this transition has also been inhibited by
inflation, lack of training and background, and
pressure from the lack of infrastructure development in the past. The government has sought to
protect the public from inflation to the greatest
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possible extent using price controls.
However,
the steep rise in the costs of goods, and the
increased demand for them, has placed a great
burden on the Egyptian budget.
For example,
subsidies for basic commodities--Iess than $300
million in 1973--reached over $1,500 million in the
1980-1981 budget.
(This exceptional rise in
budgetary outlays for subsidies was also affected
by a 56 §l&rcent devaluation of the exchange rate
in 1979.)
While this huge subsidy outlay has partially
helped the public, it has created large budget
deficits and important increases in the money
supply.
This in turn has led to inflation in
prices of non-subsidized goods.
Official price
indexes show inflation at abQut 15 percent, but
most observers estimate that prices of non-subsidized go~qs have increased by about 30 percent
annually.
However, one factor has given Egypt more
flexibility in managing the economy: an improvement in foreign exchange. Debt servicing costs
were eased by Arab nations and at the same time
disbursement from the West provided more of a
cushion.
Earnings from foreign workers, Suez
Canal revenues, and tourism have provided a
surplus in the balance of trade for the first time
in two decades. Egypt's trade balance went from
a deficit ~f $1. 5 billion in 1976 to a slight surplus
3
in 1980.
Although the trade statistics offer hope to
Egypt's economy, the two basic problems of trade
liberalization resulting from the Open Door Policy
have taken their toll.
First, Open Door trade
has had an impact on national industry and
massive consumption.
Second, Egypt has been
reduced to a country with debts and deficits
subordinate to the dictates of others, such as the
International Monetary Fund (IMF).
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In reference to the first problem, the new
laws resulting from the Open Door Policy have
had drastic effects on the consumption of local
products. The intervention of the government in
the national tire industry is a perfect illustration
of this problem with trade liberalization.
Local
tire industries in Egypt had previously met the
requirements of domestic consumption and had a
decent volume of exports when surpluses materialized from new import laws in the mid-1970s. The
public sector became overstocked with tires. The
new capitalist doctrine of the Open Door Policy
further tempted government ministries, looking
out for their self interests, to use foreign loans
to buy imported tires (in this case from Japan).
Thus, in 1978, onl~3 one-half of the local tire
production was sold.
Consumption has been tampered with to the
detriment of Egypt's economy as well. Products·
imported under the new trade concessions were
largely of the type motivated by high profits.
These products would include more of the luxury
type than the necessary. To state this another
way, a highly developed country may indeed
agree to a trade relationship with a poor country,
whereby the poor country buys a much-needed
commodity (such as wheat), or may even be
offered such a commodity as a free gift. But this
would be attractive for the developed country
only if the poor country proves to be a "good
customer" and is ready to buy large quantities of
a commodity the seller finds advantageo~~ (beer,
automobiles, cigarettes, tires, etc.).
This
situation is like a store that offers free a useful
but cheap item if customers would buy a certain
quantity of a much less useful but expensive
item. It would be foolish in such a situation to
expect to get the free gift without accepting the
other part of the transaction.
with

The impact of the second problem, a country
deficits being subjected to the power of its
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creditors, has had its far-reaching effects.
Indebtedness has reached a disturbing level in
Egypt. In 1982 alone, the external debt grew by
18.6 percent.
This figure is dangerously high
for a countrf5 that has a debt/export ratio above
200 percent.
To manage their debt problems, Egypt has
had to trim unnecessary imports and expenditures.
The following example provides a good
illustration of how pressure from creditors (like
the IMF) to cut expenses can be very hard on a
country: By 1980, one of Egypt's major expenses
was the food subsidy program. The program cost
$1. 7 billion--an amount equal to Egypt's 1979
budget deficit, or over 10 percent of the GNP.
To make any small change was extremely difficult.
Even with the food subsidies, most Egyptian
families spend ~ween 70 and 80 percent of their
income on food.
In January, 1977, the government attempted to reduce subsidies (raise prices)
on flour and some other foods because of pressure from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) ,
the U. S. government, and private American banks
to demonstrate financial responsibility.
Immediat ely the streets erupted in violent riots, killing
80 people and wounding over 1,000-.
Conclusions
In contrast to his early days as a poor
village schoolboy, Sadat rose upward and outward
from his submissive attitudes toward wealth.
Infitah--upward and outward--became the symbol
for a national struggle: the economic development
and modernization of Egypt.
Egypt is in the process of important and
dynamic change. It has set out on a course of
fundamental restructuring of its economic future.
While important steps are being taken with some
positive results, much remains to be done. Egypt
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has discovered that this change is often painful
and disruptive. It -is always easier to generate
change than to absorb it.
The most serious problems are internal:
inefficient bureaucracy, inappropriate technology,
lack of incentives for agricultural production,
population explosion, etc. It can be assumed that
there will always be a gap between the demands
that accompany modernization and the political
system's ability to satisfy those demands. Egypt
certainly has this gap and must resolve many
critical issues if progress is to be maintained and
intensified.
By allowing or encouraging the
society to wholeheartedly take on capitalistic
values and consumption habits without adjusting
them socially and economically will likely lead to
cult ural impoverishment.
By defining development in terms of a capacity to stimulate demands and solve problems,
Egypt's Open Door Policy has not been effective.
Egypt needs to change to new adaptive roles to
assimilate and properly absorb the great influx of
technology and industrialization resulting from
infitah.
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THE EXTENDED REPUBLIC AND THE CONTROL
OF MAJORITY FACTION: A CONTRAST
AND COMPARISON OF DE TOCQUEVILLE
AND THE AMERICAN LAWGIVERS

Anne Row ley*
In trod uction
The French political philosopher, Alexis de
Tocqueville, saw the endurance of American
democracy as a possible model that would enable
his countrymen to temper the ill effects of their
own democratic system.
Although he dia not
advocate that every aspect of the American model
should be strictly adhered to, he wrote about the
goodness of American laws and the wisdom of the
American Founding Fathers. Furthermore, as he
described the practical application. of their
ideology, de Tocqueville appeared to align himself
with most of their beliefs.
He disagreed, however, with one of the most
basic tenets of the American method of democracy.
In contrast to the view advocated by the
Founders, de Tocqueville did not support the
concept of the geographical extension of republics
serving as the control for violence of factions and
tyranny of the majority.
Factions, especially majority factions, are
natural to human behavior and increase rapidly in
democracies where the will of man is relatively
unrestrained. Factions also serve as the violent
vehicle for democracy's self-destructive tenden*Anne is a junior in Political Science. She
is a Truman Scholar and one of the Vice-Presidents
of Pi Sigma Alpha, Beta-Mu chapter.
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1
cies.
This propensity of factions to flourish in
liberty makes philosophical speculation on how
their effects can be controlled a central issue in
the politics of preserving and perpetuating popular government. For this reason it is extremely
important that de Tocqueville's objections to the
method prescribed by the Founders be examined
and understood. The significance of his views is
increased because de Tocqueville observed American society and political institutions after the
advent of the Founders.
The Size of the Sphere
The lack of harmony between de Tocqueville
and the American Founders on whether extending
the physical sphere of a republic controls the
effects of faction, has its foundation in a difference in the interpretation of the history of democracy and in the role of small republics in that
history. The Founders believed that small democracies, including the pure democracies of the
Greek city-states, had been scenes of contention,
strife, and tumult. J ames Madison wrote, "They
have been as short in their'l lives as they have
been violent in their deaths." . .
Conversely, de Tocqueville felt that small
republics were basically content and happy.
Their resources were directed to the internal
well-being of their people, they had no vain
dreams of glory, and the conditions among their
citizens were rou ghly eq ual.
( This opinion had
also been expressed by Montesquieu. )
De
Tocqueville further theorized that if the entire
world were composed of small democracies, there
would be no larger states to attack the small
ones, and humanity would be free and happy.
He reasoned that there is little attraction to
ambition in small republics because resources are
too limited to be concentrated in the hands of one
man, and, even if a tyrant did arise, in a small
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democracy it would not be difficult for the people
to unite and overthrow him.
De Tocqueville did not deny that when tyranny exists in a small republic it is more vicious
than in a large republic. The limited size of the
smaller nation causes despotism to affect everything within the national realm. He did claim that
tyranny is rare in small democracies because they
are the "cradle of ¥berty," and freedom is their
"natural condition."
De Tocqueville's stand on large nations,
especially large republics, is opposite to his
opinion of small nations. He admitted that ideas
circulate more freely in large nations, and that
they contribute more to the increase of knowledge, civilization, and important discoveries than
in small republics because they are able to concentrate their national resources. In his opinion,
they also have the advantage of being stronger
militarily than smaller democracies and are therefore able to withstand conquest.
Nevertheless,
for de Tocqueville, these positive characteristics
did not counter the vices of large republics such
as great wealth in the midst of dire poverty,
huge cities, depraved morals, individual egoism,
and a complication of interests.
He concluded
that these are some of the reasons that "history
gives no ex~ple of a large nation long remaining
a republic."
Ambition grows with the power of
the state and all of the passions destructive to
democracy also grow with the increase of its
territory.
De Tocqueville rejected the basic
premise of the Founders and followed the prescription of Rousseau, in that if a free people are
to remain chaste in their c~vic virtue, the size of
the republic must be small.
How then, did de Tocqueville explain the
existence of the extended republic of the United
States under this philosophy? He claimed that,
although it was true that the United State3 had
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been the only extended republic in history of any
duration, this phenomenon had occurred because
Americans combined the positive aspects of both
the large and the small republic.
He declared
that the United States "is free and happy like a
small natio~" and "glorious and strong like a
great one."
The positive characteristics of one
sphere make up for the negative characteristics of
the other. Because the United States is strong
defensively, it can focus on internal improvements
while public spirit in the union is only an extension of patriotism in the states and townships.
Similarly political passions don't spread to engulf
the nation 7because they are broken up at the
state level.
There is no doubt that de Tocqueville
favored the characteristics of the small republic
over those of the large republic. This view may
have been partially determined by his cultural
background and by his acceptance of the thought
of certain political philosophers as well as by his
understanding of history. To comprehend why he
rejected the large republic as a remedy for faction requires a deeper analysis. Therefore, an
overview of the American Founders' plan of the
extended republic is necessary.
The Founders' Plan of Extension
The Founders expected the outcome of the
U. S. Constitution to be the establishment of a
confederation of the states. Like de Tocqueville,
they did not view this larger union as a consolidation that would res'glt in the loss of each
state's political identity.
According to Alexander
Hamilton, this idea of being able to extend the
sphere of a republic through confederation was
supported by Montesquieu, and Hamilton quoted
him in "Federalist Number 9":
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It is very probable that mankind
would have been obliged at length to
live constantly under the government of
a single person, had they not contrived
a kind of constitution that has all of
the internal advantages of a republican,
together with the external force of
monarchial,
government.
I mean a
Confederate Republic.
This form of government is a
convention by which several smaller
states agree to become members of a
larger one, which they intend to form.
It is a kind of assemblage of societies
that constitute a new one, capable of
increasing, by means of new associations, till they arrive to such a degree
of power as to be able to pr0'9ide for
the security of the united body.
It was Hamilton's conviction that if such a
method of extending the sphere of republics was
not possible, then the only alternatives would be
an authoritarian regime or a small, pure democracy. Both alternatives, in his opinion, offered
only gloomy prospects because if the sphere of
democracy could not be enlarged, then it would
be impossible for each nalwn to even be the size
of the state of New York.

The American lawgivers not only believed
that a confederate republic was possible for
America, but they also felt that it was an absolute necessity for several reasons.
First, it
seemed logical to them that to take care of national concerns, like defense, a strong, energetic
national government was a prerequisite. Second,
Hamilton and other framers of the Constitution
saw the choice between a large or small republic
as a choice between the purse and the sword.
They claimed that large republics promote commerce and economic prosperity while small republics are militaristic because the people are preoc-
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cupied with governing, and they don't have time
for commerce.
Instead they fight 1IJ.l0ng themselves and with other small republics.
The most critical reason given for an extended republic is the effect that the Founders
felt it would have on both majority and minority
factions.
To them a majority faction was especially to be feared in a democracy because it is
intolerant of the rights of minorities and individuals. James Madison stated that tempering majority
faction was the main purpose of the Constitution:
If a faction consists of less than a
majority, relief is supplied by the
republican principle, which enables the
majority to defeat its sinister views by
regular vote. It may clog the administration, it may convulse society; but it
will be unable to execute and mask its
violence under the forms of the Constitution. When a majority is included in
a faction, the form of popular government on the other hand, enables it to
sacrifice to its ruling passion or interset both the public good and the rights
of other citizens. To secure the public
good and private rights against the
danger of such a faction, and at the
same time to preserve the spirit and the
form of popular government, is then the
great objfft to which our inquiries are
directed.

Factions cannot be destroyed without also
destroying their causes which are human nature
and liberty.
Obviously, "the rememdy is worse
than the disease." All that can realistically be
done to solve the problem of factions is to control
their effects by extending the orbit of the republic.
Enlarging the geographical area of the
republic would help to restrain factions in two
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ways: first, principle of representation in the
broadened sphere would allow the people to elect
men of a more noble character than that of the
masses themselves, while the broadened republic
would provide a larger selection of candidates;
and second, the enlarged sphere would take in a
greater variety of parties and interests, making it
less probable that "a majority of the whole would
have a common mottfl to invade the rights and
property of others."
This multiplicity of interests would cause the majority to be broken up
into a number of smaller factions that would,
because of ambition and greed, compete with and
balance each other.
The most dangerous and violent factions in
Madison's opinion are factions that arise from the
unequal l~istribution of "property," or class
factions.
He believed, however, that the
extended republic offered a way to check these
factions as well.
The diversity of economic
activity that is natural to a large geographical
area creates multiple factions of varied economic
interest that "cut across class lines." Association
would arise from particular rather than from class
interests.
Such an association would be impossible in a small republic where economic activity
is homogenous and usually dfmited to a small
number of occupational fields.
Under the Founders' plan of extension the
majority still exists and the people are still sovereign, but the majority is a "mixed" majority of
different interests and different classes.
Consequently, it also is a neutral majority and one
that the founders b1~eved would generally rule
for the common good.
Ultimately, the Founding Fathers knew that
if a majority was determined to get its way, for
whatever purpose, it would eventually be able to
do so.
They did hope to place constitutional
obstacles in the way of such factions. These
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would be based upon the idea of the extended
republic, and would include - representation, the
doctrine of ennumerated powers, and the national
judiciary.
The lawgivers were persuaded that
even if a majority were able to circumvent the
law, they might be restrained by religion and
morality, but the Founders also realized that
these ideals could fail, leaving no restraint upon
the will of the majority.
De Tocqueville's Observations and Argument
Alexis de Tocqueville read the writings of
the American Founders extensively, and he
observed the large middle class in America that is
considered to be the result of their thought. He
also examined the leveling effect that American
ideology had upon such measures as land reform
and education in the United States. In spite of
all of these effects, he still found ample reason to
argue with the Founders' premise that a large,
extended republic is able to control the effects of
factions.
Although de Tocqueville apparently conceded
that a majority composed of all classes and many
interests is a reality in the United States, he felt
that the mere existence of any kind of majority is
in and of itself a danger.
Unlike Madison he
believed that the majority doesn't constitute a
faction but that any majority is always in peril of
being Pl9'uaded to join the cause of minority
factions.
De Tocqueville was a great believer in the
sovereignty of the people.
Still, he did not
share the Founders' belief that a majority in an
extended republic generally seeks the public
good.
In his opinion the majority could also
serve as a mechanism of tyranny that is intolerant
of the minority or the individual that dares to
speak out against its will. In this role, it affects
and often debases the character and thought of
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the nation and imbues national leaders with a kind
of "courtie spirit" that is intent upon flattering
19
the people.
De Tocqueville's views of the majority are
strengthened because he felt that there were few
if any obstacles placed in its path. He rejected
the idea that representation allows the people to
elect men superior to themselves.
It was his
contention that they elect men in their own image
and that often the very nature of the majority,
combined with the "courtier spirit," causes leaders to be elected that corrupt themselves and are
actually inferior to the general public. He supported his thesis by pointing out the poor quality
of American leaders in his time &.fu compared to
the Founders of the Constitution.
He claimed
that there are also no other obstacles to the
omnipotence of the majority in the law of the
United States.
He explained this lacl< of
obstacles in the following way:
When a man or a party suffers an
injustice in the United States, to whom
can he turn? To public opinion? That
is what forms the majority.
To the
legislative body?
It represents the
majority and obeys it blindly. To the
executive power?
It is appointed by
the majority and serves as its passive
instrument. To the police?
They are
nothing but the majority under arms. A
jury? The jury is the majority vested
with the right to pronounce judgement
[sic]; even the judges in certain states
are elected by the majority. So, however, iniquitous or unreasonable the
measur~l which
hurts you, you must
submit.
De Tocqueville felt that the few constraints
that existed in the United States upon the majority were to be found outside the law in the
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society itself. These constraints included morality and religion, the lack of an administrative
bureaucracy (which in his opinion is one of the
tools of tyranny), and the role of lawyers as a
type 0~2 aristocracy that is acceptable to the
masses.
A fourth, and probably the most important
constraint, was that of the majority being tied to
locality and to the division of the national government with the state.
This constraint resembles the doctrine of enumerated powers and the
national-federal principle of the Founders.
De
Tocqueville,
however,
expounded
upon
this
principle and declared throughout Democracy in
America that American government had its beginning in the township. In this way he made the
idea of localism something that arose naturally in
America before it was ever <if:ficially part of the
law or constitutional doctrine.
De Tocqueville's combined thoughts led him
to see tyranny, rather than anarchy, as the
possible cause of democracy's demise.
This
tyranny is the result of the contention and strife
of factions and may gradually lead to a loss of
power that results in anarchy, but because a
society cannot remain long in anarchy, it will
revert again to tyranny, forming a continuous
24
cycle.
De Tocqueville, therefore, hypothesized, in
contrast to the Founders, that the great danger
to the existence of the United States as a democratic-republic would be not the weakness of the
union, but the strength of the union.
He postulated that the majority in the United States has
the capability of becoming so oppressive to minorities that the minority factions may eventually
oppose this oppression and retaliate, causi~ the
democratic system in American to collapse.
De
Tocqueville saw this danger as very real, and he
saw religion and morality as the only constraints
in society that could possibly be strong enough to
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Summary and Conclusion
Alexis de Tocqueville observed the effect of
U. S. laws and political institutions upon American
civil society approximately sixty years after the
founding of those laws and institutions.
In
contrast to the views of the American lawgivers,
de Tocqueville concluded neither the geographical
extension
of
the
United
States
nor
the
institutional
constraints
embodied
in
the
Constitution served to repress the violence of
factions and the tyranny of the majority.
What de Tocqueville did see as deterrents
were societal restraints, such as the basically
peaceful nature of the American majority, unaware
of its own strength, and the contributions of local
patriotism and of religion to national public
virtue.
In the matter of controlling factions,
de Tocqueville thought the effect of civil society
upon American laws was greater than the effect of
laws upon civil society.
There is some irony in the fact that
de Tocqueville's beliefs concerning tyranny of the
majority led him, a man who had privately denied
his own faith, to be more preoccupied with
religion and morality than were the American
Founders, most of whom were devoutly religious.
De Tocqueville's ideas on how public virtue and
morality serve a utilitarian function in the
preservation of democracy cause religion to
emerge as the overriding theme of his writings in
Democracy in America.
Modern critics of American politics, such as
Martin Diamond and Alexander Landi, disagree
with de Tocqueville and uphold the political
philosophy of Madison, Hamilton, and the other
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Founders on the subject of the extended republic.
More important, perhaps, is that de Tocqueville
and the Founders have each posed strong arguments, and their synthesis is really the crucial
point. Surely a democracy needs both good laws
and a virtuous populace. It needs both a strong
national government and state and local institutions that are closer to the people. The combined
thought of the Founders and of de Tocqueville
serves to make the national-federal principle one
of the most prominent of the checks and balances
of the American democratic system.
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THE CHADHA DECISION: A NEW WEIGHT
IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL BALANCE
Murray Snow*
Introduction
In the past decade, there has been an
interesting argument in American legal circles
concerning the constitutionality of the legislative
veto. This type of veto is a provision included in
legislation (and in some cases making up the
legislation itself) ~hich allows Congress to cancel
executive actions.
Some scholars argue that
since such vetoes take place and have the force
of law without receiving the signature of the
President, nor in many cases the approval of the
other House of Congress, they are unconstitutional. Others point out, however, that for the
Congress to exercise a legislative veto both
Houses of Congress must have already agreed to,
and the President have signed, a bill containing a
legislative
veto provision.
Therefore,
they
argue,
su<p
propositions
are
indeed
constitutional.
Since the first use of the legislative veto in
1932, Congress has devised several different
methods to achieve a cancellation of executive
action.
They have all subsequently come to be
known as legislative vetoes.
The first is the
one-house negative veto. A veto of this nature
authorizes either the House or the Senate to
cancel an executive action if a majority of its
members oppose it.
This is the most common
legislative veto device. The second method is the
*Murray is a senior majoring in Political
Science.
He is both a Truman and a Karl G.
Maeser Scholar.
He plans to attend law school
this fall.
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one-house positive veto. In this case, before an
executive action can be made permanent, at least
a majority of one House of Congress must approve
it.
Though this type of veto action has been
considered by Congress, it has not yet been
used.
Other veto provisions which have been
frequently used are those requiring either approval or disapproval of executive acts by concurrent resolutions of both Houses of Congress
such as the War Powers Act.
Still other veto
provIsIOns permit approval or disapproval of
executive actions by the majority vote of a House
or Senate committee. Finally, other such propositions permit Congress to approve part of a~
executive action while disapproving another part.
Many cases have been brought to court
challenging the constitutionality of the legislative
veto, but only two have been decided on their
merits. In the first, Atkins vs. u. S., the U. S.
Court of Claims ruled that the legislative veto was
a proper congressional exercise of authority
under the Necessary and Proper clause. In the
second, INS vs. Chadha, the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals ruled that the legislative veto provision in the ImmJgration and Nationality Act was
unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court, shortly
after the Ninth Circuit Court's decision, agreed
to review the Chadha case and ultimately upheld
that court's opinion.
The decision reached in
this case should prove to play a significant role
in balancing the power between the executive and
legislative branches of government in the near
future. My research question is then, what will
be the public policy implications of the Supreme
Court's decision in IN S vs. Chadha?
To answer this question it will be necessary
to first examine the Chadha case and the resulting opinion of the Supreme Court. It will then
be necessary to determine the breadth of the
court's decision.
Notably, does the reasoning
expressed in this opinion invalidate all legislative
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vetoes or merely one-house vetoes such as the
one found in the Immigration and Nationality Act
upon which the Chadha case was based? Or, was
the decision sufficiently narrow so as to strike
only the legislative veto provision in the Immigration and Nationality Act? Once these questions have been answered, it will be possible to
evaluate some of the public policy implications of
this decision and to suggest methods through
which Congress might be able to continue to
constitutionally pursue its oversight function in
light of the Court's reasoning.
The Chadha Case

5

Jagdish Rai Chadha, an East Indian born in
Kenya, was admitted to the U. S. in 1966 with a
non-immigrant student visa. The visa expired on
June 30, 1972, but Chadha remained in the country.
In October of 1973, he was summoned
before the district director of the National Immigration Service to show cause why he should not
be deported. Chadha, under Section 244 (a) (1)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act, requested
a suspension of deportation. This section of the
act gave the attorney general of the United States
the discretion to suspend deportation of aliens
who met three conditions established in the act:
First, the alien must have been in the United
States continuously for a period of seven years.
Second, he had to be of good moral character,
and third, his deportation would have to result in
extreme personal hardship.
The following June after an investigation, it
was determined by an immigration judge that
Chadha met all the requirements; consequently,
his deportation was suspended.
In accordance
with the Immigration and Nationality Act, Congress was advised of the suspension.
The act
then gave either House of Congress the right to
veto the attorney general's decision and invalidate
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the suspension anytime within eighteen months
after it was notified of the suspension. If Congress failed to act within this time period, the
alien's status would be permanently changed to
that of permanent resident alien.
In late December 1976, the House of Representatives, upon the recommendation of the House
Judiciary Committee, voted to veto the suspension
of Chadha and five others.
The following January, Chadha's original immigration judge reopened proceedings to deport Chadha.
Chadha
moved to block the hearing on the grounds that
the section of the Immigration and Nationality Act
which granted Congress the legislative veto was
unconstitutional.
The immigration judge refused
to rule on the motion since he ha<t no authority to
rule on the constitutionality of the sections involved.
The Board of Immigration Appeals also
refused. to respond to the motion for the same
reasons. Chadha finally filed a petition with the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals for a review of his
deportation order.
The court, after hearing
arguments, dismissed the deportation action on
the grounds that the legislative veto contained in
the act violated the constitutional doctrine of
separation of powers.
The Supreme Court's Decision
The Chadha case was accepted by the
Supreme Court on a writ of certiorari shortly
after the Ninth Circuit Court had ruled.
The
case was first argued in the court in February
1982, but at the end of the term no decision was
announced.
Rearguments were held in the 1982-83 term,
and a decision upholding the Ninth Circuit Court
was released on June 23, 1983. Before addressing the question of the constitutionality of the
legislative veto in his opinion written for the
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court, Chief Justice Warren Burger established
that Chadha had ~tanding, and that the case was
a justiciable one.
Then, he began to examine
the constitutionality of the legislative veto.
According to the Court, Article One of the Constitution establishes several different requirements
for all legislative actions:
All legislative Powers herein granted
shall be vested in a Congress of the
United States, which shall consist of a
Senate and a House of Representatives. Art. I, s.l. (Emphasis added)
Every Bill which shall have passed the
House of Representatives
and
the
Senate, shall, before it becomea Law,
be presented to the President of the
United States; . . . Art. I, s. 7, cl. 2.
(Emphasis added)
Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to
which the Concurrence of the Senate
and House of Representatives may be
necessary (except on a question of
Adjournment) shall be presented to the
President of the United States; and
before the Same shall take Effect, shall
be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be passed by two
thirds of the Senate and House of
Representatives, according to the Rule~
and Limitations prescribed in the Case
of a Bill. 7 Art.!. s.7, c1.3. (Emphasis added)
According to the Court, the intent of the founders concerning these sections of Article One is
clear. The legislature, in the view of the founders, was inherently the most powerful branch of
government. It was therefore most necessary to
contain the power of that branch. As one limitation, it . was decided to require that legislation
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pass through both Houses of Congress to ensure
that the implications of all legislative acts would
be carefully evaluated before being sent to the
President
for
his
signature.
The
next
requirement, that of presentment of the legislation
to the President, would constitute the second
check on congressional power. The President, in
effect, would represent the national interest and
not the factionalized smaller interests one could
find represented in Congress. If the President
objected to a bill, he could veto it and thus
prevent its implementation.
If he approved a
bill, he could sign it, and it would become law. It
is clear that the founders intended for all
congressional initiatives to pass by this process
when it is noted that Madison, in debate over
Section Seven Clause Three of Article One, when
the section applied only to bills, suggested the
idea that the legislature might try to escape the
requirements imposed in the section by substituting the word resolution or vote in place of the
word bill.
Consequently,
the Constitutional
Congres~ changed
this clause to its present
reading.
To prevent the President from arbitrarily
blocking Congress and deadlocking the government with his veto power, the founders provided
that if two-thirds of both houses voted to do so,
they could override the President and implement
the legislation over his veto.
Does the legislative veto action taken in the
Chadha case amount to a legislative act that would
be subject to the bicameral and presentment
requirements established by the Constitution for
all legislative actions?
First, the Court holds
that when any branch of government acts, "it is
presumptively exercising 9the power the Constitution has delegated to it."
The power the Constitution has assigned to either House of Congress
is that of legislation. Although there are express
powers granted to the separate Houses of Con-
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gress which are not legislative in nature, and
thus not subject to the bicameral or presentment
requirements of the Constitution, they are included in the Constitution in explicit and unambiguous terms. These powers are those of the
House to bring impeachment charges against
officials, and of the Senate to ratify treaties,
judge in impeachment cases, and approve or
disapprove presidential appointments included in
Sections Two and Three of Article One and
Section Two Clause Two of Article Two.
The
very explicit nature of these provisions provides
support
for
the
Court's
conclusion
that
"congressional authority cannot be implied," and
that powers that are not specifically granted to
Congress, and are unobtainable through t~o
Necessary and Proper Clause, are denied.
Therefore, all legislative actions apart from these
special cases specified in the Constitution are
required to meet the specifications of bicameralism
and presentment.
Second, whether a matter is in fact an
exercise of legislative power depends upon the
subject of the actions taken.
In the Chadha
case, it is clear that the action taken has been
legislative "in purpose and effect." The House of
Representatives has altered "leg'al rights, duties,
and relations of persons including the Attorney
General, Executive branch officials, and Chadha,
[all
of 11 whom]
are
outside
the
legislative
branch. "
What this veto decision amounts to is
a policy decision by Congress which, in absence
of the veto provision of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, would have required that a bill
be passed by a majority of both Houses of
Congress and be presepted for the President's
signature to become law.
The Court acknowledges that the legislative
veto is "efficient, convenient, and useful in
facilitating functions of government."
But the
mere fact that it is useful does not mean that it
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is constitutional.
The Court in fact rules that
the congressional veto provision in Section 244
(c) (2) of the Iramigration and Nationality Act is
unconstitutional.
The Breadth of the Court's Decision
The Court in this decision has obviously not
only ruled on the constitutionality of one legislative veto provision, but has established requirements for all actions of a legislative nature
which seem to preclude virtually any form of the
legislative veto.
Although there was some
speculation after this decision concerning the
status of legislative vetoes
by
concurrent
resolution, a reading of the decision reveals that
even vetoes passed in both Houses still fail to
meet the presentment requirements established in
the opinion, and thus would presumably also be
uncons ti tu tional.
Justice Powell, though agreeing with the
opinion of the court in the Chadha case, expresses the view in his concurring opinion that
the decision should have been based on narrower
grounds. He finds that Congress, in its determination that Chadha does not meet the criteria
established for permanent residency, has assumed
a judicial function and thus violated the principle
of separation of powers. This alone, according to
Powell, would b sufficient to decide the case in
14
Chadha's favor.
Instead, he notes that "The
court's decision . . . apparently will invalidate
the use of the legislative vet~5 The breadth of
this holding gives one pause."
Justice White, although agreeing with Powell
that the case could be decided on narrower
separation of powers issues, dissents in the case.
He does not, however, seem to have any arguments about the resolution of the Chadha case
itself. He is rather dissenting from the prece-
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dent which in his opinion destroys the legislative
veto.
Today the Court not only invalidates
s. 244 (c) (2) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, but also sounds the
death knell for nearly 200 other statutory provisions in which Congress has
reserved
a
legislative
veto....
[ The] decision strikes down in one fell
swoop provisions in more laws enacted
by Congress than the court has 1Uumulatively invalidated in its history.
Though White in a footnote to his dissent
expresses the hope that perhaps some form of a
legislative veto will eventually be held as constitutional, (he suggests that a resolution of
disapproval might not have legal effect in its own
right, and thus not be supject to bicameral and
presentment requirements)
in light of the
Court's decision it seems unlikely, even to him.
Assuming, then, that the reasoning in the
Court's opinion, as well as the concurring and
dissenting opinions of Powell and White indicate
that, at least for the moment, all legislative
vetoes can be held unconstitutional, what will be
the consequences for Congress?
The History of the Legislative Veto
To answer the above question, it will be
necessary to determine what statutes containing
legislative vetoes were in force when the Chadha
decision was made.
The history of legislation
containing the- veto goes back to 1932, when
Congress authorized President Hoover to reorganize the executive branch subject t01~he disapproval of either House of Congress.
During
the remainder of the 1930s and 19405, twent¥§
three
other
veto provisions were passed.
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Several of these bills were again grants to the
President to reorganize the executive branch
subject to the approval of Congress. The majority of the remainder of the veto legislation passed
during this period was special grants of authori2~
to the President to cope with World War Two.
An example of such legislation would be the
Lend-Lease Act. In this act Congress authorized
the President to trade destroyers to Britain for
leases on British military bases, but the Congress
retained the power, through a legislative veto, to
strip him of this authority at any time. Roosevelt
thought at the time that the veto proposition in
the Lend-Lease Act was unconstitutional, but, he
did not veto the b¥l because it was necessary to
his foreign policy.
Though Roosevelt's failure
to veto the legislative veto in the Lend-Lease
legislation did not put an end to its use, as it
might have done, none of the statutes from this
time period are affected by the Chadha decision
since the subject matter of that legislation is no
longer relevant to any ongoing governmental
program.
During the fifties and sixties, the legislative
veto became much more commonly used. In fact,
eig'hty-three statutes containing such Wovisions
were passed during these two decades.
In the
early fifties the veto began to be used to regulate
immigration pr~~esses and. gov;rnment co~str~c
tion contracts.
The ImmIgratIOn and NatIonality
Act, which was the legislation under question in
the Chadha case, w~4 first passed in 1952 and
then revised in 1967.
The Congress found that
delegation of such matters as immigration to
executive or independent regulatory agencies,
subject to a veto of disapproval by Congress, was
a convenient way to discharge their growing
responsibilities.
With the continued growth of
government during this period, it soon became a
necessity for Congress to delegate many matters
other than immigration and government construction to executive departments and regulatory
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agencies for administration. 25
The rules that
these agencies made in the process of enforcing
congressional legislation consequently had life
same force of law as did congressional statute.
But often the rules made by these agencies
went far beyond, or actually conflicted with, the
intent of Congress in this legislation. The honorable Edith Green, congresswoman from Oregon
and author of Title IX of the Secondary and
Higher Education Act of 1972, gave a striking
example of just such an occurrence to students at
B YU.
In a forum address delivered at B YU in
the midst of that institution's struggle with the
housing regulations issued by HEW subsequent to
Title IX, Ms. Green identified the original in ten t
of that section in The Secondary and Higher
Education Act.
The thirty-six words that make
up the title were intended, according to Ms.
Green, to "promote equality of opportunity among
the sexes by eliminating admissions restrictions,
scholarship discriminations, and providing female
profes2?rs with the same pay as male professors. "
Unfortunately, HEW manufactured over
20,000 words of regulations to enforce Title IX
alone, which, among other things, had the effect
of "eliminating intercollegiate sports, co-ed physical education classes, all male-choirs, the Boy
Scouts, the Girl Scouts," and many other organizations. This "illegitimate progeny" of Ms. Green's
legislation ~:gs often tempted her to deny original
authorship.
Ms. Green also mentions in her address
other Congressional problems in the regulation of
administrative agencies. For instance, the speed
with which these agencies make rules pursuant to
legislation, compared to the time it takes Congress to overturn objectionable rules by specific
statute, is an overwhelming obstacle for Congress. One month after the passage of the bill
authorizing OSHA in April 1971, a special 250page edition of the Federal Register was pub-
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lished imposing new federal regulations derived
from the original O~JIA legislation which was only
a few pages long.
In the face of regulating
such prodigious regulatory activity, many Congressmen argue that the legj81ative veto is the
only acceptable alternative.
With the veto
provision included in legislation, Congress could
eliminate the objectionable regulation by a majority
vote of one House. Such a procedure was much
easier than the passage by both Houses of Congress and submittal to the President for approval
of a change of agency rules.
The increase in regulatory activity and the
desire of Congress to oversee such regulation
would have been enough to ensure the growth of
the legislative veto in the 1970s. But legislative
vetoes began to be used as well during this
period to exercise direct checks on presidential
initiatives. Over the course of America's history,
Presidents had gradually usurped, or been freely
granted by Congress, powers that were not
originally granted to that office in the Constitution. For instance, the evolution of the executive agreement allowed th"e President to make
agreements with other countries without submitting to the approval process of the Senate which
seemed to violate the intent of the founders. As
well, America had fought in the Korean and
Vietnam wars without ever receiving any declaration of war fr~m Sqngress which the Constitution
seemed to reqUIre.
The Congress, sensing the growing "imperial" nature of the Presidency, determined to
subject several of the presidential prerogatives to
the legislative veto.
Consequently, Congress
passed bills which were in essence legislative
vetoes, giving it the right, among other matters,
"to approve executive agreements to sell arms to
foreign nations, to veto import relief decisions
made by the executive, to determine which nations could have most-favored nation treatment in
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trade matters, and to determine which countries
are eligible 3~r ineligible for military or economic
assistance. "
Some of these bills were measures
such as the War Powers Act, the Budget and
Impoundment Control Act, and the International
Security Assistance and Arms Control Act. These
acts, while leaving the President some degree of
discretion in such areas as war powers, budget
management, and international arms sales, still
required the consent of at least one, and often
both Houses of Congress before his actions could
be fully carried out.
The legislative veto, then, has been used as
a congressional device to control the executive in
two broad areas.
First, it is an attempt to
control or at least oversee the administration of
legislation by executive and independent regulatory agencies. Second, it attempts to control the
initiatives of t~ President himself in the pursual
of his policies.
Due to its newfound dual use,
the Congress passed eighty-one laws containing
163 legisla \ve veto provisions in the first half of
the 1970s.

3

In light of the amount of legislation passed
in the last three decades containing legislative
vetoes, the Court's decision in INS vs. Chadha
could have enormous implications. Justice White,
as an appendix to his dissent, added a selected
list of different statutes containing legislative
vetoes which, as a consequence of the court's
decision, will be affected. These statutes regulated areas in almost every field of government,
but especially in the areas of "governmental
reorganization, budgets, foreign affairs, war
powers, regulation of trade, s?S5ty, energy, the
environment, and the economy."
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The Effect of the Legislative Veto
and Its Cancellation

Despite the fact that the legislative veto has
been widely used in legislation in the past several
years, if it has not been an effective method to
fulfill the congressional oversight function, there
will be few, if any, implications for public policy.
There seems to be little debate, however,
regarding the efficacy of the legislative veto in
regulating agency rule making.
Its cancellation
should therefore prove to have the potential to
return a considerable amount of regulatory
"power" to the administrative agencies of the
executive branch.
The effect of such a power
transfer is currently" an item of some controv~rsy.
Proponents of the legislative veto claim that
this power now returns to a mass of fourth,
fifth, and seventh l!J(fel bureaucrats, who are
responsible to no one.
Such bureaucrats, these
veto proponents claim, are only trying to build
their domain of influence, and have no electoral
check, as does the Congress.
To deny the
legislative veto to Congress, as Chadha has done,
is to invite a return to the regulatory abuses of
the OSHA regulation and Title IX.
Opponents of the veto, however, applaud the
decision of the Court.
They contend that the
veto device placed too much power in the hands
of Congress, and that this power would be more
dangerous vested in Congress than in the administrative agencies.
First, they claim, the probability of governmental deadlock is much lessened
by the Chadha decision.
An agency trying to
execute its
statutory
responsibilities
before
Chadha could be continually frustrated by legislative vetoes. When issuing a veto, the Congress
is not required to indicate on what grounds they
find a particular rule objectionable.
Instead of
offering suggestions for possible alternatives, it
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merely issues rejections.
Congress can, consequen tly, easily hide responsibility for failure of
implementation on the "governmental bureaucracy"
when, in reality, the failure is its own. Second,
the legislative veto tends to permit sloppy legislation. Since Congress, with the veto, has been
able to implement its will regardless of the statute's actual content, legislation tends to be less
carefully written.
This invites litigation and.
waste, and is the cause of some confusion in the
regulatory agencies themselves.
Third, special
interest groups exercise a large influence in
Congress.
When special interest groups find
certain administrative rules objectionable, as some
certainly do, they can exercise considerable
pressure on Congress to veto the rule.
This,
veto critics point out, is hardly in the public
interest.
Also, the veto's presence in statutes
regulating industry allows Congress to be constantly revising rules which regulate that industry and consequently deprive those who are
concerned of any sense of I3fiTmanency in the
rules regarding their industry.
The striking of the veto will result then,
according to the opponents of the Court's decision, in an increase of "red tape" and a power
grant to an unelected and uncontrollable bureaucracy.
Proponents of the decision find that it
will result in the elimination of the potential for
governmental deadlock, and the end of sloppy
legislation which could result in increasing litigation.
Also limited, according to those who
favor the decision, will be the power of special
interest groups to regulate government, and the
past impermanency of governmental regulation.
Both opponents and proponents of the
Court's decision seem to conclude that, with
Chadha, the Court has concluded that once Congress has delegated the power to make laws to
regulatory agencies, it is limited iIJ~ts control of
the rules that those agencies make.
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The legislative vetoes intended to place limits
on presidential power have had a far more ambiguous effect. Some of them such as the International Security Assistance and Arms Control Act,
which requires the President to gain approval of
the Senate for all arms sales to other countries,
have been undeniably effective. Note, for exampIe, the rather extended Senate hearings regarding the sale of AWACS radar planes to Saudi
Arabia.
Others, however, have not been so successful.
For example, the Budget Impoundment and
Control Act provides, among other things, that if
the President impounds already budgeted funds,
either House of Congress, acting within forty-five
days of the receipt of such information, may
require the President to spend those funds.
In
1976, the General Accounting Office reported that
President Ford had violated the act by failing to
report the impoundment of 126 million dollars
budgeted for child nutrition and education programs until after the adjournment of the annual
session of Congress. By the time Congress had
reassembled, the government had entered a new
fiscal year, and thus lacked any power to force
hi~9to spend funds in the previous year's budget.
It has also been asserted by Miller and
Knapp that the War Powers Act, which allows
Congress to remove troops placed in combat
situations by the President, if, after 60 days, a
majority of both houses of Congress do not consent to the deployment of the troops, is actually
an empty shell which would never be invoked in
the case of a Presidential commitment of troops to
a combat situation. This is partly due to the fact
that, as in the Mayaguez incident, often the
military action in question would be terminated
long before the time limit in which the President
could freely act would be reached.

unity

Second, the need and tendency for national
in crisis situations seems to suggest that it
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would be rather unlikely for Congress to override
the President should any conflict last over the
sixty-day limit. The War Powers Act thus seems
to be another Congressional veto provision which
has had little ~ffect in practice in spite of its
theoretical goal.
In short, though the Chadha decision has
the potential to return the power to the President
to institute freely his foreign and domestic policy,
it is doubtful, in at least the instances cited
above, that the President had ever lost it.

Legislative Remedies
Not long after the Chadha decision was
reached, then Secretary of the Interior, James
Watt, wrote a letter to Representative Morris
Udall informing him that due to the Supreme
Court's recent Chadha decision, Udall's House
Interior Committee no longer had the authority to
ban the Interior 4pepartment's controversial Montana coal sales.
Although this legal opinion
may have been technically correct, the executive
departments and regulatory agencies would do
well not to assume too much power as a result of
the Chadha decision.
F. M. Kaiser, a senior research analyst for
the Congressional Research Service, in seeming
anticipation of the Chadha decision, wrote an
article detailing the techniques that Congress has
successfully used in the past to overturn agency
rules, and sugg'ests them as possible alternatives
to the legislative veto.
Interestingly enough,
Kaiser suggests five statutory methods and six
nonstatutory methods which Congress has at its
disposal to regulate administrative agencies other
than the veto.
All, of course, are not equally
efficacious.

116

PI SIGMA ALPHA REVIEW

The first method is the statutory rejection of
a regulatory rule. This is a difficult and timeconsuming procedure requiring the agreement of
both Houses of Congress and the signature of the
President.
It has, however, the advantage of
being a very effective method of overturning
agency rules. In fact, the definition and clarity
which necessarily accompany a statute make the
statutory rejection a much more powerful ref,w:ation of an agency rule than a legislative veto.
Second, Congress has the authority to cut
off funding for any regulatory program or, if it
chooses, for the enforcement of a particular rule.
Though this is an undeniably effective method for
enforcing the legislative will reg'arding the enforcement of regulatory agency rules, it too has
its drawbacks. For this method to be effective,
it is necessary for Congress to reimpose the
budget restriction on an annual basis.
Besides
the fact that yearly action is necessary, some
regulatory activities, unfortunately for Congress,
fall under J3udget allocations which are virtually
indivisible.
Third, the bill which originally authorizes
agency regulation in a certain area could require
that specified agencies consult on possible regulations pursuant to the legislation.
The establishment of this or other procedural requirements,
could provide new insights and perspectives on
possible rules and, in any case, would slow down
the rule-making process w~!ch wOl,lld make
Congressional oversight easier.
Fourth, Congress could also require that
agencies submit their proposed rules for congressional review before implementation.
Though
Congress no longer has the power to veto any
objectionable rules that it might find, the fact
that an agency's proposed regulations would be
reviewed might res'4st in more careful drafting of
agency regulations.
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The final statutory method which Kaiser
suggests has been the most popular to date in
regulating agency functions.
Congress, it must
be remembered, holds the ultimate trump of
altering the authority of regulatory agencies.
This could be accomplished in a variety of ways.
First, Congress can grant exemptions of authority
to the agency head. Second, it can remove areas
from the jurisdiction of the entire agency.
Third, it can, by statute, end regulatory rule
making activities in certain areas. Fourth, it can
provide certain organizations subject to agency
regulations with waivers from such agency regulations. Fifth, it can transfer the regulatory
authority from one agency to another more apt to
comply with Congress. And sixth, Congress can,
if it wishes to do s~6 completely deregulate the
industry in question.
Although this method can
be effective, it can also be dangerous.
Sometimes the change of agency jurisdiction
to frustrate the implementation of objectionable
regulation causes confusion as to which, if any,
regulatory agency is concerned with which regulatory activity.
This confusion tends to leave
some areas which need regulation completely
unregulated and, in the case of waiver provisions, leaves some businesses completely free from
all regulation under a particular agency in what
seems to be a discriminatory practice.
The nonstatutory methods which Kaiser
suggests, would also seem to have considerable
potential to regulate agency rules. First, pursuant to its legislative oversight, investigative,
and confirmation functions, Con gress could instigate an embarrassing oversight hearing into the
regulatory actions taken by a particular agency.
Second, it could establish permanent subcommittees to oversee agency rule making in general.
Third, it could include with each bill which
authorizes agency rule making Cong-ressional
instructions
regarding
such
implementation.
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Fourth, members of Congress could make floor
statements critical of ongoing or proposed regulatory programs.
Finally, congressional offices
concerned with the implementation of a particular
piece of legislation could enter into direct contact
with the regulatory agency assigned to admWster
the bills implementation to offer their input.
Kaiser points out that due to the nature of
politics, these nonstatutory methods may prove to
be more effective in the long-run in overseeing
agency activities 4ihan the statutory methods he
has cited above.
However, it should be noted
that they offer no direct effect on the rules made
by agencies. They are only attempts to pressure
the agency in question into conforming with the
congressional will concerning implementation of its
legisla tion.
The main reason Congress opted to use the
legislative veto so extensively was due to the
relative ease it provided Congress in dealing
directly with specific agency functions.
All of
the options mentioned above by Kaiser have their
relative strengths and weaknesses, but it should
be noted that to achieve the same result, virtually all of them require considerably more effort
on Congress's part than did the legislative veto.
Senator Jacob Javits, a proponent of the
veto, points out that the policy of congressional
delegation of legislative authority to the executive
branch is too deeply JIPbedded in governmental
policy to be reversed.
But, if Congress now
has to spell out to the regulatory agencies with
each bill just exactly what regulations they can
and cannot make, or if it has to go through
strenuous machinations to negate the effectiveness
of one rule without damaging the regulation of
others, it will be little advantaged by such a
policy.
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In light of the many methods offered by
Kaiser through which Congress can control regulatory agencies, the question raised by the
Chadha decision is not whether Congress has the
power
to
regulate
administrative
agencies.
Rather, the question seems to be whether or not,
in view of the time requirements which such
action would cost an already overburdened
Congress, the legislative branch will have the will
to impose its power on such agencies.
It is my conclusion that Congress, while not
relinquishing the power to regulate administrative
agencies, will find that the loss of the legislative
veto will require the use of methods which are
not nearly as efficient.
Consequently, Congress
will probably continue to regulate what are, in its
opinion, the most serious administrative abuses of
legislative authority, but it will not have the time
to regulate as completely the implementation of its
legislation as it has in the past.
The result
should prove to be a return of substantial initiative to the executive and independent regulatory
agencies in the administration of legislation.

Though the legislature, in spite of the
Chadha decision, retains the power to exercise
control over regulatory agencies, should they
decide to use it, it is not at all clear that in the
absence of the veto it will be able to retain much,
if any,
of its authority over presidential
initiatives.
Although Kaiser's suggestions would seem to
be a powerful congressional tool in overseeing
administrative agencies, it is doubtful that many
of these techniques can be used successfully to
regulate presidential initiatives.
Administrative
agencies, for the most part, owe their existence
to Congress; therefore, Congress can manipulate
their jurisdiction as it chooses.
However, the
President can claim authority from the Constitution, which puts him on a coequal basis with
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Congress.
As Kaiser suggests, the legislature
does have the final trump of refusing to finance
any presidential actions it opposes.
But, it is
not nearly so easy to cut off the funding of
presidential programs as it is to restrict the
budgets of administrative agencies. In the first
place, it is the President himself who submits the
budget to Congress. Theoretically, this does not
affect the power of Congress to alter the presiden tial budget, but practice seems to indicate
that the executive preparation of the budget can
be a large advantage to the ~cfesident in the
preservation of his programs.
Besides this
fact, the Congress, except in rare circumstances,
is not unified against the President. The President, whoever he may be, can count on at least
minimal support from those who are in his party,
and from those who support his spending programs.
Consequently, though it is not impossible, it is very difficult to withhold appropriations from a spending program which the President truly desires to implement.
In the past, congressional attempts to control the President through the legislative veto
have suffered from the failure of Congress to
clarify just what was meant by certain terms used
in the veto provisions or by the failure of the
veto to really propose an acceptable remedy to
the presidential action in question.
The President has often used these ambiguities to his
advantage.
Note, for instance, the funds for
child nutrition and education which were successfully impounded by Ford in spite of the Budget
Impoundment and Control Act, and the failure to
invoke the War Powers Act in the recent crisis in
Lebanon due to Reagan's ref.usal to a?~r:owlesIPe
that the Marines had entered mto "hostllitles."
It is probable that
gain some say over the
tial initiatives which
through the invalidation

Congress will attempt to
acceptability of presidenit has apparently lost
of the legislative veto. I
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would suggest that in doing so, Congress repeal
any veto legislation such as the War Powers Act
which contains possibly ambiguous terms behind
which the President could hide. Then, it should
replace such vetoes with statutes which either
define constitutional terms or require that certain
presidential actions be carried out subsequent to
the Cons tit ution.
For instance, if Congress
desired to regain the power to declare war, it
could repeal the War Powers Act, and in its place
pass a statute defining exactly what a state of
war is. Since the Constitution gives to Congress
the power to declare war, should a President
continue to carryon hostilities after he has
surpassed the congressional definition of what a
state of war is, he would be subject to impeachment by the House of Representatives.
It is
interesting to note that, in such a proceeding,
the jury would be the Senate, and would presumably recognize the validity of its own legislation.
The President would, of course, have
recourse to the courts to challenge the statute,
but, it seems to be a strong possibility in view of
past cases involving war powers, that the court
would find that the question was a political one,
and would not accept the case for argument.
However, if the Court were to accept the case,
the Congress could note that the Supreme Court
has held in Gibbons vs. Ogden that the power
granted to Cong'ress to regulate commesfe is also
the power to decide what commerce is.
It does
not seem to me to be a great leap of logic to
assume, then, that the power to declare war is
the power to decide what war is. It would, in
any case, be seemingly difficult for the Supreme
Court to declare such a statute unconstitutional
and still maintain that
Congress had any
meaningful power to declare war. Nonetheless, if
the
courts
were
to
hold
the
statute
unconstitutional, Congress would still have recourse to the nonstatutory method of an oversight
hearing which, though time-consuming and im-
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practical in the long-run, could bring
political pressure to bear on the President.

some

Using this same method, and with a little
imaginative legislation, Congress might regain
much of the authority over presidential initiatives
that it seemingly lost through the Chadha decision.
For instance, Congress might pass a
statute which required that all arms negotiations
be conducted by treaty. If such a method were
to be held constitutional, or if the courts refused
to hear the case due to its nature, Congress
would regain the power they seemingly lost
through the invalidation of the legislative veto
provision in the International Security Assistance
and Arms Control Act.
~

.

might be noted, however, that some
serious disadvantages accompany this method of
action.
First, Congress must try to regain
control over presidential initiatives in a piecemeal
fashion. There appears to be no blanket method
through which Congress could regain the control
over the President it has apparently lost through
the Chadha decision. If Congress cannot stake a
valid constitutional claim in areas in which it
desires to regain some control over presidential
initiatives, it will probably never regain it.
Second, any definitional statutes passed by
Congress are bound to be somewhat arbitrary;
they cannot, consequently, constitute a cure-all
in terms of regaining for Congress the discretionary powers it desires. Third, and most significantly, any such measures would almost certainly
have to be passed over presiden tial vetoes. The
super-majorities required to pass such legislation,
in light of party and other allegiances, would be
most difficult to obtain.
It

It is an inescapable conclusion, considering
these obstacles, that the Chadha decision has
given to the President the unique power over
much of the U. S. foreign and domestic policy he
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enjoyed before Congress began to restrain the
Presiden tial office through legislative vetoes.
Though there are methods through which Congress could reassert its check on presidential
power,
it is doubtful,
given the political
considerations involved, that it would ever be
able to successfully implement them. And, even
if it were to successfully implement some such
legislation, it would probably be impossible,
without the President's acquiescence, to reobtain
the broad control over the President which
Congress enjoyed before INS vs. Chadha.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court, in its Chadha decision,
effectively invalidated all le.gislative actions which
are not subjected to bicameral approval and
presentment to the President for his signature,
other than those specified in the Constitution.
This decision seems to have effectively invalidated
all uses of the legislative veto.
This veto has been an effective tool for
Congress in controlling administrative agencies
and, to some degree, presidential initiatives. Its
invalidation will require Congress to use less
efficient means for overseeing regulatory activity.
This will have both positive and negative results.
For instance, Congress will probably be more
careful in the content of its legislation and will be
less able to change agency regulations subject to
pressure from special interest groups. As well,
Congress will probably introduce procedural
barriers to slow down immature regulatory activity. However, as congressional oversight costs
Congress more time, it is apt to engage in less of
it.
This will return a considerable degree of
discretion to the appointed agency officials of the
executive branch who are likely , in some instances, to frustrate the legislation's original intent.
Due to the lack of checks on government bureau-
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and the time-consuming methods
to regulate their activity, promore serious misapplications of
will be rectified by Congress.

With the Chadha decision, Congress also
loses considerable ability to control presidential
initiatives.
Though
again,
theoretically,
Congress is not left without recourse; political
realities seem to suggest rather strongly that
Congress will fail to re gain, in any significant
measure, its former control over the President.
Despite the fact that the legislative veto has
been a useful tool to Congress, its utility has
not, and perhaps should not have, saved it from
being declared unconstitutional and thus void.
But, in its refusal to acknowledge the practical
application of the veto, the Court has refused to
consider the alternatives left to Congress in its
absence.
In so doing, it has, in my opinion,
promoted the ascendancy of the executive branch
over the legislative, which, in the intent of the
founders, would probably have been at least as
unconstitutional a concept as the legislative veto.
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EARL Y ELECTION PROJECTIONS: DO
THEY AFFECT VOTER TURNOUT?

Shelley Snow*
The political emphasis in the United States is
nominally on participatory democracy, and yet an
increasing number of people are not taking advantage of their greatest opportunity to participate--the vote. Voter turnout in this country is
declining, and everyone involved in the political
process is concerned about that decline.
One
contribution to this decline, according to many
politicians, voting rights groups, and others, is
the influence of national television and radio
broadcasts of early election predictions and
projections on the voting behavior of the American electorate. Their concern seems to be that if
Westerners, particularly those living in the five
Pacific states (California, Oregon, Washington,
Alaska, and Hawaii), hear the projected outcome
of an election before the polls close, they will be
less likely to get out and vote. The early predictions, they feel, are not conducive to maintaining an atmosphere of fair elections and maximum
participation.
The networks, as well as many
academicians, con tend, however, that there is not
enough evidence to show that early election
predictions have any influence on voting behavior, and that any attempts to restrict the broadcasting would violate media rights guaranteed by
the First Amendment.
This paper will examine
the arguments of both sides in order to determine
what problems, if any, exist in early election
broadcasts.
*Shelley is a senior majoring in Political
Science and has worked as a judge in the ASB YU
Commons Court. This fall she will be working on
a Master's degree in Political Science at the
University of Tennessee.
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History of Election Broadcasting
The changes in election reporting over the
past sixty years can be attributed to the development of broadcasting, computer, and polling
technologies--first in radio and later in television.
In earlier election reporting, networks often hired
field assistants to report newly counted returns
in various jurisdictions.
The process was slow
and inaccurate, however, and the networks had
to spend so much time gathering and analyzing
the datl). that little air time was given to the
returns.
The year 1952 brought the advent of both
television and computer processing, changing the
course of network election broadcasts.
The
computers, though primitive, could count and
analyze votes more efficiently, and announcements
could be made more quickly.
However, the
networks realized the potential inaccuracy of
computer returns, and used the analysis with
caution. In 1956, the networks began using more
advanced video and computer technology, using
for the first time elaborate visual aids such as
maps that lit up to illustrate different voting
regions for viewers. Two trends began in 1956:
an increased emphasis on special reports, and the
practice of 20mmenting on a race and predicting
its outcome.
Beginning in 1960, the networks subtly
shifted their mode of election reporting and took
on a more aggressive way of broadcasting electionnight news: rather than passively reporting' vote
results, they began interpreting and analyzing
the data for their viewers. In 1960, the race was
not only between the two presidential candidates
but also between the networks to see who could
present the results of that close election race
first.
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The competition between networks increased
in 1964, to the point that for the first time early
election predictions were given even before the
West Coast polls closed.
A cooperative effort
between the three networks, called the National
(now News) Election Service (NEW), was established to promote efficiency in returns and analysis. The NEW sped up network returns considerably, enabling them to give early projections,
and promoting extensive discussion over the
merits and effects of such broadcasts. Nineteen
sixty-four was also the first year that research
was conducted into the problem of early election
projections. Congressional hearings ~ere held in
1967 to study the perceived problems.
The 1968 and 1972 elections were much the
same, except that the 1972 race was so lopsided,
the outcome was evident with or without news
commentaries.
One development which became
clear, however, was that networks were relying
less on actual vote count and more on other data
such as sample data analysis and exit polls.
The 1980 election was characterized by cries
of outrage from politicians
and voting rights
groups that the early projections are unethical
and imposing. More hearings were held to again
go through the arguments that had been heard
since before 1960.
Criticism of the networks' projections rang'es
from mild comment to bitter diatribe. Most of the
critics believe that the early election projections
are disruptive to the electoral process, that early
projections demean the value of the individual
vote (particularly of those in the West), and
therefore carry no useful societal purpose. Some
witnesses in the 1981 hearings before Congress
testified of the "terrible side effects" of the
"modern reporting machines of 1980," and quoted
some
discouraged voters as saying, "We have
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been che~ted!" and "We don't count! Why bother
to v~te?"
Speaking of the "infection by projection" problem, San Francisco Mayor Diane Feinstein ?aid, "Clearly, the vote ~f the West is not
equal to the vote of the East."
Marvin Field of
San Francisco's Field Research Corporation called
the networ ks' reporting "irresponsible. "
"My
feeling is, whether there was a drop-off in turnout or not, it's psychologically wrong for quasiofficials 7to declare a winner before the polls are
closed. "
On this note, Truman Camp bell, Chairman of the California State Republican Party said,
"I think the analogy is that nobody goes to a
ballgame in the ninth inning when the score is
100 to nothing. 8 And that's just about what's
happened here."
Some even claim that the
predictions "are in the nature of a created event
by the networks, seemingly for the s~e purpose
of fostering inter-network competition."
Many critics cite the Supreme Court decision
in CBS vs. The Democratic National Committee
which states:
Congress intended to permit private
broadcasting to develop with the widest
journalistic freedom consistent with its
public obligation.
Only
when
the
interests of the public are found to
outweigh the private journalistic interests of the broadcaster will government
power be ap8erted within the framework
of the Act.
Is the public interest in this case outweighed by
private journalistic enterprises?
Is the public
interest at stake at all?
This criticism of the
networks basically assumes that exposure to
election predictions and projections immediately
before voting is sufficient to make the potential
voter act in a way somehow different from how he
would have, had he not heard the projections.
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The networks and the majority of academicians who have studied this problem argue differently.
The networks say that there is no
definitive proof whatsoever that projections have
an effect on voting behavior--either to make a
voter change his intended vote or to decide not
to vote at all. Statistical evidence in study after
study, beginning in 1964, shows no influence on
voter behavior, or an influence so small that it
can hardly be detected.
William
Leonard,
President of CB S, said:
Our position is clear and uncomplicated.
Our job is to report quickly and accurately as we can information we have on
any subject, including election results.
To . . . "exercise voluntary restraint"
and withhold information we know to be
true would be a viollJ.1"fon of our fundamental responsibility.
Warren Mitofsky, Director of the CB S Election and
Survey Unit, said in a telephone interview:
While you're suggesting that the people
in California shouldn't know the votes
in Florida (Le., the Eastern States),
what you're also saying is that people
in Florida shouldn't know it either.
Now I don't think these people would
believe that there's a right not to
know.
California's wish to keep the
votes secret really is infringing on
Florida's right to know how they've
done and what they're (the wIling
places) making publicly available.
The networks use not only broadcasts to make
election-night projections, but also a number of
other modes including telephone calls, telegrams,
news wire services, and newspapers. "Are we to
muzzle every possible avenue of information about
the progress of the election for the entire election
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day and night?,,13 The ml~ia have stated that
they are willing to listen,
but to solid evidence--not perceived notions.
Before one considers broadcasts and their
effect, one must first consider basic theories
concerning the media.
First, for the media to
have an impact on an individual, that individual
must pay atten tion to it.
I n other words, not
only must one watch the broadcast, one must also
listen to it.
It has been proven that both
attention and recall of news is greatest among the
highly interestedisthe most attentive and the
strong partisans.
One must consider also an
effect called "selective exposure," which is the
tendency to select out of broadcasts only 1tpformation that conforms to ideas and values.
Even
an individual listening to the news might select
only those things he wishes to hear and ignore
those he does not wish to hear, such as the fact
that his preferred candidate is purportedly losing. Even if the voter does listen to the news
and does not subconsciously select out the information that his candidate is losing in certain
states, it may not affect his behavior. Wolfinger
and Rosenstone report that "regardless of how
firmly a person believes his vote will not affect
the outcome, the likelihood that he wi¥7 vote
increases with his interest in the election."
With this basic information, we can address
the issue at hand by considering two points:
first, whether there is a gross influence on
individual behavior; and second, whether the
early projections have a net result on the actual
outcome of the election. These will be discussed
by
exploring
three
separate
subtopics:
(1) potential and actual level of exposure;
(2) effects of exposure on the vote switching;
and (3) effects of exposure on turnout.
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Exposure to Returns and Time of Exposure
Ironically, this is the area in which "antiprojectionists" (those who criticize early election
projections) feel they hold the strongest argument
against early projections, and yet it is the one
area in which there is the most agreement. The
actual time the networks began their projections
in any given election year is recorded and is
therefore incontrovertible.
In 1960, all three
networks projected Kennedy as the winner by
10:30 p.m. EST (half hour before most polls close
in the West).
In 1964 the presidential victory
was so lopsided (even before the election itself
began) that calls were made fairly early, precipitating dissent from the West. In 1968, the race
was so close it was difficult to make predictions
until the race was completely over, long after all
the polls had closed.
Like 1964, the race in 1972 appeared from
the start to be a landslide, so that all the
networks were off the air by 2:00 a.m. EST,
again precipitating cries of outrage.
The 1976
election was much like the 1968 race--too close to
call--and the first prediction came at 3: 20 a. m.
EST Wednesday morning.
The 1980 presidential
race, however, was different from the previous
races; the race was deemed as close, but NBC
predicted Reagan the winner at 8: 15 p. m. ES T .
AB C declared Reagan the winner at 9: 52 p. m. ,
and CBS at 10:32 p.m. The interesting twist in
this election was the concession of the race's
incumbent--Carter--which came at 9:45 p.m. EST,
before either AB C or CB S had predicted a
winner.
Thus, the only prediction that could
possibly have influenced Western votes in the
1980 race was the NBC broadcast, given only an
hour and a half before Carter's concession
speech. The anti-projectionists claim that these
early projections are the main problem in the
issue of influence on voting behavior; at least in
the case of the 1980 election, many more issues
were centrally involved.
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But while the times of the returns are
incontrovertible, the actual effects of the exposure to returns are not.
To determine actual
effects of exposure on voting behavior we must
first single out the potential effects of exposure
on behavior. The potential for any voter to be
exposed to returns can only arise, obviously,
after the broadcasts have started.
Since most
voters in the United States have a television set
or radio, or access to one, the potential for
exposure to returns at any given time after they
have started is fairly high.
According to one
study, two-thirds of the studied population
recognized they had been exposed tOlfredictions
at one time during the elections day.
Another
study claimed that 92 to 96 per.&nt of its studied
population had been exposed.
Therefore, in
the course of the day a large proportion of the
population heard or watched some kind of election
news.
In determining the influence of voting behavior, we must look at that portion of the eligible voting population that voted after the broadcasts had begun.
Most sources seem to agree
that, particularly in 1964, about two-thirds of the
voting population had voted by the time the
projections started at approximately 7: 00 p. m.
ES T, given time for pre-result commentaries, etc.
(see Table 1 in Appendix). One regional breakdown indicates that by 7: 00 p. m. ES T, 95 percent
of the East had voted, 89 percent of the Central
region, 69 percent of the Mou~ifn region, and 64
percent in the Pacific region.
Thus, a maximum of only 33 percent to 36 percent of the
Western voters could potentially have been influenced by the broadcasts, assuming that 100
percent of that one-third had been listening or
paying attention to any election news broadcasts.
However, a noted study done by Aage Clausen,
Study Director, Survey Research Center, at the
University of Michigan, concluded that nationwide
only 5 percent had heard an election broadcast
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and voted afterward, and in the Pacific States he
found only 14 percent (this study will be discussed below).
In California Harold Mendelsohn
found only 12 percent who had heard and voted
afterwards, and Douglas Fuchs found only 13
percent. The small deviations in these three
studies' statistics tends to give credence to their
findings, and support to their theory that there
is a statistically small number of people that
actually hear the reports and vote afterwards.
Professor John E. Jackson at the University
of Michigan, however, stated in a study that the
networks in 1980 commented on the results of the
election long before they actual declared any
official results, thus accounting for the number of
people that believed they heard the predictions
earlier than they possibly could have.
Therefore, people were influenced in their behavior by
the media even bwre the actual network declarations were made.
The rebuttal for this argument is that in an upcoming election, comments or
even preliminary survey results can be seen or
heard days and even weeks in advance.
Thus,
network commentaries have no relation to projections in that viewers understand commentaries
are OpInIOnS, and projections are (nominally)
based on actual results.
To prove that many
people hear about the election before results are
broadcasted, Kurt Lang did a study and found
that 14 percent of Eastern voters, who were not
susceptible to broadcast projections before voting,
had heard or seen something ~at indicated to
them how the election was going.
Thus, only one-third of the Western voters,
according to most reports, is potentially affected
by early election broadcasts, and only 14 percent
at most have been found to have listened to the
reports and to have voted afterwards. To determine the actual effect on behavior, actual voter
behavior must be studied. The only way behavior
can feasibly and with any degree of scientific
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accuracy be measured is by survey polls (which
of course can be problematic in themselves if they
are poorly worded or have biased or inaccessible
questions, etc.).
To measure change in voting
behavior due to election-day broadcasts, a poll
must measure pre-election intent and actual
election behavior.
Changes in intended and
actual behavior may give us more clues as to
possible effects of media on voting decisions.
Effects of Exposure on Vote Switching
"Vote switching," otherwise known as the
"bandwagon" or "underdog" effect, is the change
between pre-election candidate preference and
post-report of voting. Vote switching and turnout (discussed in the next section) are the two
main
areas
of voter
behavior
that
antiprojectionists are concerned with. Their claim is
that early predictions influence people to either
change their vote intentions to vote for the
reported winner (bandwagon effect); to change
their intentions and vote for the reported loser
(underdog effect); or not to vote at 2:fll even
though they had intended to do so.
Antiprojectionists fear that change in preference
inten tion could change the outcome of an election.
Senator Hartke in front of a Senate hearing
fielded this hypothetical example:
The late President Kennedy won
the 1960 National election by a 112,692
plurality vote. If one voter in each of
the 173,000 voting precincts in the
U. S.
had switched his vote from
Mr. Kennedy to Richard Nixon, Nixon
would have won the popular vote.
However, this switch in votes cast
would not automatically have meant a
different president in 1960.
Realistically, had there been a
switch of one vote in Nixon's favor in
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each of the 10,400 precincts in Illinois
plus a switch of nine votes in each of
the 5,000 precincts in Texas, Mr. Nixon
would have tallied the required 270
electoral v~4es and would have been our
president.
The question is, how likely is a voter to change
his vote? Unlike the hypothetical example given
above, quite a bit of statistical evidence has been
gathered about vote switching.
An important consideration in examining vote
switching is the time the voter made his decision
about election. Common sense would tell us that
more newly formed decisions about who to vote
for or whether to vote at all would be more
susceptible to influence by election predictions
than would be decisions that had been made, for
example, since the convention.
According to
Aage Clausen, the popular idea that a majority of
people make their candidate choice late in the
game is a fallacy.
He says that only 2 to 4
percent of voters actually make their decisions on
election day according to pre- and post-election
interviews (see Table 2). In an analysis of the
1964
election,
scholars
such
as
Clausen,
Mendelsohn, Lang and Fuchs made various conclusions concerning vote switching.
First, the
percentage of voters found to have reached their
decision on election
day was
very
small:
Clausen, 4 percent; Lang, 4 percen; Mendelsohn,
8 percent. Second, the voters who were found to
have switched their vote according to their polled
voting intentions was also small: Clausen, 5
percent nationwide; Fuchs, not more t~ 4
percent; Mendelsohn, 3 percent at the most.
Dr. Clausen's survey divided the studied
voters into two groups: group A, those who
voted before broadcasts or who voted after but
did not hear the broadcasts; and group B, those
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who had voted after they heard the predictions.
If the predictions did cause a change in preference, then group B would have a higher deviation
from intentions.
In fact, the proportion of
switches is the same in both groups: one out of
twenty. Thus, although this does not prove the
predictions had no effect, neither does it support
claim~6 that they do produce changes in behavior.
Also, not one of his 1,074 respondents
mentioned election projections in connection with
the reasons for his vote.
Like Clausen, Mendelsohn found that 97
percent of his 1,212 respondents voted as they
said they would, with only 1 percent switching
(two percent refused to say). Of that one percent (14 people), 12 voted for Goldwater and two
for Johnson, indicating if anything a slight
underdog effect.
Warren Miller found similar
results: four out of five eligible adult voters
carried out their intentions. He says that there
is no evidence exposure is associated with changes in behavior; in comparing voters who developed expectations about the result of the election
as a result of hearing the predictions with those
who heard but did not develop expectations,
there was no differen<t6 in consistency of behavior
(see Tables 3 and 4).
According to statistical evidence, then, the
bandwagon or underdog effect does not seem to
exist, or if so, in very minute percentages.
Further evidence comes in the fact that 97 percent of Southern Californians polled disagreed
with the statement: "If I have no clear p reference, 1 ike to be for the man who is runnin g
ahead."
Unfortunately, the anti-projectionists
do not seem to have any statistical evidence
arguing the existence of bandwagon or underdog
effects, so there is little to which to compare the
presented evidence.
However, they argue that
the early election projections do more than to
simply make a voter change his preference; more
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important, the projections influence him not to g'o
to the polls at all. It is toward this issue--the
effect of projections on turnout--that they point
most of their arguments and criticisms.
Effects of Exposure on Turnout
Of these three sections of the issue of media
influence, this one is the most hotly debated.
Voter turnout has been 2~onsistently dropping
since 1960 (see Table 5),
and politicians and
voting rights groups want to find out why.
Turnout dropped to a near low in the most recent
presidential election, to 53.9 percent; this figure
translates into nearly 74 million Americans who
were eligible but failed to vote, the largest
number in a presidential election in the nation's
history, despite the surge of participation in the
South. Turnout particularly in the West has been
declining at a faster rate than in the rest of the
country. The recent outcry, of course, is that
media election coverage is responsible--in part if
not completely--for the decline. The argument is
that no one will get out and go to the polls and
vote in an election they believe is already decided:
Common sense seems to indicate that a
man who sits down to dinner just before
going out to vote, switches on the TV
and hears that so and so has already
been declared the winner, might not
~ng~§'e himself in an exercise in futillty.

In the three House hearings and one Senate
hearing that have been held over the past 26
years, many have come forward to testify against
the prediction procedures the networks use.
March Fong Eu, California Secretary of State,
testified that in 1980 her staff closely watched
hour to hour percentages of voters going to th'e
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polls, and based on those percentages judged the
total percentage for the day to be 79.3 percent.
However, only 77.24 percent actually voted,
"suggesting a significant fall-off of participation
after 5: 00 p. m. " She also cited a Field Institute
Survey which found that 10 percent of those who
said they were registered but failed to vote
specifically blamed their failure on early projections. 3that translates into some 401,000 nonvoters. "
Former Congressman James Corman
(CA) and Al Ullman (OR) both testified they
believe their defeats were caused by early election projections, because, they said, participation
declines hurt inc'3~bents and media coverage
cause that decline.
A Los Angeles Times poll
in 1980 showed that 2.4 percent of registered
voters claimed they did not vote because of early
projections, and an L. A. county registrar said
turnout was down 1 percent from the 1976 election
in hours after the broadcast time. The Director
of the Committee for Study of the American
Electorate also testified that turnout declined in
three out of five Western states most affected by
broadcasts, and therefore some elections were
decided by a little as 25 votes (in the case of a
County Supervisor) and 800 votes (in the case of
some Congressmen).
Not only does turnout
potentially affect the outcome of presidential
races, it also affects (and more drastically)
outcomes in local elections.
Dr. John Jackson gives a fairly convincing
argument for effect of exposure on turnout. In
his study done in 1980, he defines the intent to
vote as the probability of voting.
He estimates
the probability of a person voting after 6: 00 p. m.
EST as a function of their stated intent, time left
to vote, region, and exposure. Using probability
statistics he shows that the probability of turnout
is less after six than before six. The media, he
conclude~4 are responsible for that drop in probability.
The two problems with this study,
however, are (1) Can one use probability to
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determine human behavior? and (2) While there
may indeed by a drop in probability in turnout,
there are many factors besides solely media
influence that could account for tl1e drop-particularly Carter's concessions at 6: 45 PST in
1980.
The same basic problems are inherent in a
Wolfinger study done in 1980. He tries to show
that a 2.7 percent deviation from expected turnout to actual turnout "suggests that the ~works
did indeed affect Pacific voting in 1972."
The
problems other than equating the perceived drop
in turnout with effects of the media are (1) in
1972 the only election on the California ballot was
the presidential; and (2) the census data he used
was gathered weeks after the election and represents only one random member per household.
The networks and the majority of academicians completely disagree with the claims of these
politicians and voting rights groups.
The networks are as concerned as anyone about declining
voter turnout, but they have found no conclusive
evidence to prove that their projections contribute
to the decline. When dealing with the effect of
exposure on turnout, as with the last section, it
must be remembered that we are dealing with 12
to 14 percent of the eligible Western voters--those
who had been exposed and voted afterwards.
Also, we are only dealing with the 1964, 1974,
and 1980 elections (the only ones in which early
predictions were made), even though the 1980
race was an anomaly due to Carter's concession.
A number of studies done after 1964 show
that the effect of influence, if any,
was
ne gli gable . Miller found that the great majority
of the voters were stable on preference and
participation (according to intent). The proportions of those who changed either preference or
participation were
the
same for those w~~
were exposed and unexposed (see Table 3) .
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Mendelsohn found that of his 1,074 respondents,
approximately 1 percent did not vote though they
had intended to, and in a one-hour post-interview
not one of 31hem mentioned exposure to election
broadcasts.
Fuchs and Lang both found similar
results using pre- and post-election interviews
and statistics.
Epstein and Strom in particular have developed an interesting argument. They say that the
West's declining voter turnout relative to the rest
of the country is only indicative of a trend, since
in five out of six past presidential elections (both
with and without early projections) Western
turnout has been less than in §\~m-Southern
non-Western states (see Table 6).
In 1960
when the suspense was high, the rest of the
country voted 4.4 percent more than the West.
However, in 1964, with the broadcasts, the rest
of the country only voted 1.5 percent more. And
in 1972 Western turnout was actually higher than
the rest of the country. If the assumption that
network projections are reducing Western turnout
is true, then in years when early predictions are
made turnout should decrease substantially more.
However, the opposite is true.
In 1964, 1972,
and 1980 Western turnout declines were less than
for the rest of the non-Southern country.
He
concludes that "if anything, these data seem to
indicate the perverse notion that early netw~9k
projections cause Western turnout to increase!"
John Jackson criticizes the "unrealistic
assumptions about elections and turnout" that
these studies make, and says that many variables
including salience of issues and candidate appeal
"dominate these aggregate turnout statistics and
thus obscure any 4lfI1pact on individual turnout for
early reporting."
This may be true; however,
it does show that Western turnout in general is
not declining simply because of media influence.
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The big concern among voting rights groups
now is that networks depend more on exit poll
predictions instead of actual election returns.
The problem with this, the critics say, is that
exit poll results are prone to large error, and an
inaccurate prediction could mislead viewers.
While in 1980 only one network used exit polls 4~
make projections, in 1982 all networks did.
This indicates a growing trend in the use of exit
polls, enabling networks to make earlier and
earlier projections even further impairing the
voting process.
According to Warren Mitofsky, though, exit
polls are a "red herring." CBS has been using
exit polls since 1967, and they only use the
information gathered in the polls to supplement
raw election results. While they will gauge the
progress of a race using exit polls, they "never,
ever c~~ on election based or exit polls-period. "
While exit polls have the potential for
abuse, they have been used fairly cautiously by
the media, and do not presently appear to be a
factor in changes in voter behavior.
Solutions and Conclusions
The solutions politicians have come up with
to solve this perceived problem are many and
varied. The networks themselves have suggested
uniform polling hours, but some arg'ue that some
regions would sacrifice desirable voting times and
there would be added expense in keeping polls
open in late hours. Besides, the problems of exit
poll predictions would still exist and would probably get worse.
Some have suggested Sunday
elections, but this might conflict with religious
and recreational activities, would eliminate churches as polling places, and would entail substantial costs in opening public buildings on Sunday.
A voting holiday has been proposed, but hoJidays
cost the government $18 million per day, and
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recreational alternatives would doubtless be more
attractive than voting.
Congressmen have also
suggested prohibiting the release of any election
results until all polls are closed, but voting
rights groups say that will force networks to rely
more heavily on exit polls.
One last proposal
would prohibit any broadcasting of predictions
before all polls were closed, but the obvious First
Amendment violations would prohibit this proposal
from being passed.
The question is, should legislation be passed
on a perceived notion? No completely conclusive
evidence on either side of this debate has been
drawn to date. Congress has been debating this
issue for at least 20 years and has not passed
any legislation on it, indicating strong doubt that
a problem really exists. All the researchers and
voting rights groups have been able to conclude
is that maybe there is an influence on voter
behavior from early election projections.
One
voting rights group study states that, while they
found "sufficient evidence to warrant concern,"
the "evidence of impact of projections on vot~3
turnout was indicative rather than conclusive"
(emphasis added).
While studies done to prove
there is no relationship between early projections
and voter behavior are inconclusive in the sense
that they have not proven so beyond a shadow of
a doubt, they are still highly reliable since one
can never really demonstrate nonexistence scientifically.
Overall, research has found little
individual change in voter participation or preference during a campaign, and these findings have
led to the generalization that the media has no
discernible effect on voter behavior.
Besides the statistics, a close look at the
logic--the basic assumptions--used by anti-projectionists will reveal a major discrepancy.
The
report done by the Committee on the Study of the
American Electorate consists almost entirely of
"proofs" that early election projections exist, and
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therefore voter behavior is affected.
The networks, though, fully concede to the allegations
that they project early results, but do not concede to their effect on behavior.
The logic of
the anti -projectionists runs like this: the decline
in voter turnout obviously results from the effect
of early election projections, since many people
will doubtless hear them, pay attention, and be
influenced in their behavior. Since there are so
many other potential long- and short-term forces
at work on turnout, the assumptions made about
the association between broadcasts and influence
are incomplete, and therefore are not valid. The
logic therefore is faulty.
One must also consider the three elections in
which early predictions were made--1964, 1972,
and 1980. In 1964 and 1972, the races were so
lopsided that a landslide had been predicted for
quite some time, and their outcomes were foregone
conclusions. As Warren Miller says, it is useful
to remember that election night broadcasts are
simply an extension of all the coverage that has
been going on during a campaign, and the creation of expectation concerning election results h~~
gone on for months before any national election.
The 1980 race was a bit different, however; the
race was deemed as close until the election started, and then the outcome was made readily apparent. While the projections were indeed relatively early, any statistics that might show that
the projections affected outcome are skewed by
Carter's concession, which came only an hour and
a half after the first network prediction, and
before the other two networks' predictions.
The problem in discussing an issue like this
is the vast discrepancy in reports; some scholars
using fairly similar techniques come up with
completely different findings.
However, one
conclusion that can be drawn is that there is no
immediate emergency, and no qualified evidence to
call for a change in the present system. While
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the networks should constantly be on guard to
produce accurate results and to be certain that
guesses are labeled as such, little can be done
legislatively that would not infringe upon the
media's First Amendment rights. The notion that
"perce~ion may be at least as important as the
proof"
should not dominate legislative motivation
for action.
In comparison with influences on
voter turnout such as registration procedures or
interest in the election, the influence of election
night coverage seems small indeed.
Instead of
worrying about problems that might exist, Congress should invest its time and money into more
pressing problems concerning voter turnout.
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APPENDIX
TABLE 1
COlltlI.A1'IVE VarIlIG IN ALAMEDA COUNTY. CALIFO!UIIA

NOVEMBER 3. 1964
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*Taken from Douglas Fuchs, "Election-day RadioTelevision and Western Voting," Public Opinion
Quarterly 30 (Summer 1966) :229.
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TABLE 2
(In percent)
Time of Decision

Before the conventions
At the time of conventions
After the conventions
Last 2 weeks of campaign
On election day
Total

1952

1956

1960

1964

36
32
21
9
2

60
19
12
7
2

31
31
26
9
3

41
25
21
9
4

100

100

100

100

*Taken from Aage Clausen, "Political Predictions and Projections: How Are They Conducted?
How Do They Influence the Outcome of Elections?"
Hearings of the Telecommunications Subcommittee,
U.S. House, 90th Cong., 1st sess., July 1967,
p. 164.

TABLE 3

Turnover in. preelection. intentiof1.8 and election day behavior

Percent

a. No change from preelection choice for President and preelection intention to vote (or not to vote) _________________________________________
h. Chnn~('d In pr('ference only; no chnnge in pnrtlcipatlon_______________
c. Changed, participation only (intended to vote but didn't or didn't intend
to ,(>te but did) ; no change in preference_____________________________
d. Changed on both preference and participation_______________________
1'otnl (N==13S3)_______________________________________________

78
13
8
1
100

*Taken from Warren E. Miller, "Analysis of
the Effect of Election Night Predictions on Voting
Behavior," Hearings of the Telecommunications
Subcommittee, U.S. House, 90th Cong., 1st
sess., July 1967, p. 212.
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TABLE 4

(In percent)
Slab Ie on Participation Preference
preference
slable,
slable,
Changed .on
and
preference participation
bolh
parlicipalion changed
changed

Tolal

(I) Respondent felt he know the outcome on elec·

tion d"y because of Information from the
predictions he heard ......•.........••...•
1:2) Respondent fell h. knew the oulcome on elec·
tion day but did not get this information from
Ihe predictions which he heard .•..•..•....•
(3) On elecllon day respondent did not know who
was going to win, although he heard predic·
tions .....•.....•..••...•••...... ___ ...• _
1:4) Respondenl did nol hear predictions, bul
listened 10 elecllon relurns __ • ___ ._._. __ ._.
(5) Respondenl did not lislen 10 election relurns __ ._

*Source:

see above.

77

14

83

10

8

100

79

14

6

74
69

12

12

17

100

10

100
2
4

100
100
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TABLE 5

FIGURE 1-2
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*Taken from Wm. Flanigan and Nancy Zingale, Political Behavior of the American Electorate, 5th ed., p. 12.
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TABLE 6

Turnout in the South, West, and the Rest of the U.S., 1960-1980*
Year

South

1960

40.3

a

(Change)

West

b

65.9

1968

50.9

1972

44.5

-.9

-1. 5

-6.8
57.4
-.7

+1.9
49.0

-5.8
58.9

53.3

47.7

-2.6
64.7

60.1
+3.2

1980

67.3

61.0
+6.4

1976

-3.0

-4.8

+5.4

52.6

(Change)

70.3

65.8

45.5

Non-Wes t

-.1

+5.2
1964

Non-Sout~ ,

(Change)

-1.0
56.4

* Regional turnout was calculated by dividing the estimated regional voting age
population into the number of votes cast in the region. The data is taken from
Statistical Abstract, 1979; Census Bureau, 1980, and Federal Election Commission
1981 as reported by Associated Press.
a. South Includes the 11 former Confederate States.
b. West includes Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon, and Washington.
c. The District of Columbia is included after 1960.

*Taken from Epstein and Strom, "Election
Night Projections and West Coast Turnout,"
American Politics Quarterly 9 (October 1981): 482.
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PI SIGMA ALPHA ACTIVITIES 1983-1984
Dialogue and Doughnuts
Dean
of Family,
Jones of
discussed
viewpoints
tively) .

Martin B. Hickman of the B YU College
Home, and Social Sciences and Eric A.
the B YU Political Science Department
the "Korean Airliner Crisis" (from the
of U. S. and Soviet actions respec-

Dr. Rhett R. Ludwickowski, former chair of
modern political movements at Jagiellonian University in Krakow, Poland, and currently a
visiting scholar at Stanford University's Hoover
Institution, spoke on "The Nature of Totalitarianism. "
Fred W. Freindly, a noted journalist, professor emeritus of Columbia University, and former
President of CBS, talked about the delicate
relationship between the mass media and the
political institutions of the U. S. Constitution.
Additional comments were made by Utah Supreme
Court
Justice
and
former
B YU
President,
Dallin H. Oakes.
UNESCO official, Robert H. Cluff, addressed
the topic of the U. S. invasion of Grenada and
conflict in the Caribbean.
Former director of the Rockefeller Foundation's Division of Social Sciences, Joseph Black,
talked about his recent experiences working with
development programs in Indonesia, focusing on
their political, economic, and social ramifications.
Michael Skol, Director of Policy Planning for
the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, U. S. State
Department, discussed the previous and current
negotiations
between
Nicaragua,
other
Latin
American countries, and the United States. He

also talked about the reasoning
actions taken against Nicaragua.

behind

U. S.

Dean Mann of the University of California,
Santa Barbara, spoke on the topic of "Environmental Policy."
University of Virginia scholar, former editor
of The American Political Science Review, and
National President-elect of pi Sigma Alpha,
Dr. Charles Jones, talked about Reagan's campaign strategy for 1984 as a continuation of the
President's 1981 agenda setting.
He also discussed the political implications of the recent
democratic primary elections on further presidential campaigning.
Welches and Cheese
Dr. Donna Lee Bowen spoke at Dr. Vetterli's
house on "The Lebanese Quagmire."
Pi Sigma Alpha members had their
"Oktoberfest" at Professor Paxman's cabin.

own

Rod Decker,
political writer of KUTV
(Channel 2) and Lavar Webb, political columnist
of the Deseret News, met with PSA members at
Dr. Vetterli's house. They spoke about the "1984
Elections and Utah politics."
PSA members met at Dr. Mel Mabey's home
and heard him speak about his experiences covering the 1983 British elections.
The last Welches and Cheese was held at
Dr. Stan Taylor's house.
Hugh Nibley related
the "adventures" of Wenamon, an ancient Egyptian
diplomat,
to demonstrate the importance of
appealing to people's humaneness in diplomatic
relations.

Colloquia
Papers presented by Political Science faculty
this year to Pi Sigma Alpha included the following:
"Goodbye to
Capable Cathy"

Goodtime

Charlie--Hello

to

-- Dr. Keith Melville
"Plebiscitary Democracy: The Initiative and
Referendum in American Politics"
--Dr. David Magleby
"Drawing the Lines:
Legislature versus
Commissions in Reapportionment"
--Dr. Lee Farnsworth

FACULTY NOTES

Donna Lee Bowen and Evelyn Early, of the
University of Notre Dame, have received a grant
from the National Endowment for the Humanities.
With the grant, Bowen and Early will compile a
Middle East reader, which will provide background information for undergraduate courses on
the Middle East.
Professor Bowen also helped
found the Maghreb Studies Group, comprised of
scholars specializing in North African studies.
The National Endowment for the Humanities
awarded a grant to Gary Bryner to organize a
conference on the Bicentennial of the Constitution.
Historians, political scientists, and legal
scholars will be at BYU from May 16-18, 1984, to
discuss various constitutional issues.
Lee Farnsworth continues to publish his
Newsletter of Research on Japanese Politics. He
recently completed a chapter titled "Japan and the
Third World" for the book Third World Policies of
Industrialized Nations published by Greenwood
Press.
Earl Fry is currently on leave as a fellow of
the Council on Foreign Relations serving as
Special Assistant to the United States Trade
Representative in the White House.
The David M. Kennedy Center for International Studies recently awarded Ladd Hollist a
fellowship to study poverty and industrialization
in Brazil, Taiwan, and Korea. His book on the
subject, Land, Poverty, and the State: The
Political Economy of Development in Brazil, Korea,
and Taiwan, will soon be published by Pinter
Press.
His article, "Dependency Transfigured:
Brazilian Agriculture in Historical Perspective,"
appeared in Dependency Reversal and Less Developed Countries published by Praeg'er.

F. LaMond Tullis and Ladd Hollist are
editing two books: A Global Political Economy to
be published by Westview Press, and The Political
Economy of Global Agriculture to be published by
University of Nebraska Press.
David Magleby's book, Direct Legislation:
Voting on Ballot Propositions in the United
States, has been published by Johns Hopkins
Press.
Dennis Thompson has been appointed as the
Secretary to the Politics and Ethnicity Research
Committee of the International Political Science
Association. He was also appointed as chairman
of the B YU Political Science Department.
His
book, The Private Exercise of Public Functions,
will be published by Associated Faculty Press in
the fall of 1984.

